On Wednesday, October 31, 2018 at 6:15:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Oct 2018, at 11:34, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 4:30:00 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical
>>>>>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before
>>>>>>> humans,
>>>>>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of
>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or
>>>>>>> yesterday.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers
>>>>>> in the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a
>>>>>> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence)
>>>>>> as true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical
>>>>>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”,
>>>>>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call
>>>>>> material reality ….
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of
>>>>>> any language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the
>>>>>> combinatorical reality, which is independent of language too, but it
>>>>>> might
>>>>>> be harder to see this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or
>>>>>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for
>>>>>> centuries.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was
>>>>>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and
>>>>>> perhaps
>>>>>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I
>>>>>> doubt
>>>>>> this too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ],
>>>>>> written by Mark Balaguer [
>>>>>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is
>>>>>> prime that there is a moon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a
>>>>>> theory in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an
>>>>>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of
>>>>>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are
>>>>>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary
>>>>>> test,
>>>>>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The
>>>>>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum
>>>>>> mechanics,
>>>>>> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in
>>>>> mathematics at some level of language:
>>>>>
>>>>> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the
>>>>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth
>>>>> value, Rutgers, March 2013*
>>>>>
>>>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>>>>>
>>>>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as
>>>>> "reduction to physics:
>>>>>
>>>>> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
>>>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
>>>>>
>>>>> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>>>>>
>>>>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which
>>>>> the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if
>>>>> they
>>>>> are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at
>>>>> some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level.
>>>>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking
>>>>> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the
>>>>> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the
>>>>> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor
>>>>> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and
>>>>> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are
>>>>> invisible
>>>>> from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has
>>>>> grown up around the relation between these views."
>>>>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism
>>>>>
>>>>> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By
>>>>> materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. Then, depending on how
>>>>> people define “primary matter”, this can be related with physicalisme.
>>>>> Physicalism is the doctrine that all science are reducible in principle
>>>>> to
>>>>> physics.
>>>>>
>>>>> All this is not so important, as Digital Mechanism makes even very
>>>>> weak form of materialism and physicalism dubious. Mechanism leads to a
>>>>> reductive ontology (what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …), but prevent
>>>>> any effective reductionism of the phenomenologies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Codicalism* (all matter has codicality) is a variant of hylomorphism.
>>>> There is just matter, not a "pre" or "prime" or "primal" matter.
>>>>
>>>> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism
>>>>
>>>> http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The objection i raise to a purely information (numbers) processing
>>>> reality: One can get all possible physics (or any science) theories out of
>>>> it, and all modal agent (self-references, beliefs, intentions) languages,
>>>> but the theories and languages are not the things.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree with this. With mechanism, reality, whatever it is, is not pure
>>>> information processing. Note that elementary arithmetic is already quite
>>>> above what is accessible by information processing, and the
>>>> phenomenological physical reality inherit that non computable aspect.
>>>> On the century matter and physics emerges from one unique sum on all
>>>> computations. It has to be the same physics for all machine. Physics
>>>> becomes theory and machine independent.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> One needs experience processing. Matter is the only candidate to
>>>> substrate both information and experience processing.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Experience processing is explained by the relation between information
>>>> processing and truth, which is above all form of information processing.
>>>>
>>>> Matter? I don’t know what it is, unless you mean what we observe, but
>>>> up to know, machines observe the same matter, in a reality which dos not
>>>> assume its primitive, ontological existence.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> By "information processing" I include all possible arithmetical *and*
>>> *hyperarithmetical
>>> *[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ] (what other
>>> arithmetic is there beyond all that?) processing.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is way above Mechanism. I can understand the need if you want some
>>> primitive matter to exist, but that will not be enough, I think.
>>>
>>
>>
>> What arithmetical processing is there beyond even hyperarithmetical
>> processing? But in any case, arithmetical + hyperarithmetical processing
>> does not cover implementation of phenomenal experience (i.e.
>> consciousness). For that, a material substate is needed.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But experience (consciousness) is outside all of that (Galen Strawson).
>>>
>>>
>>> That is true with mechanism too. The internal phenomenologies in
>>> arithmetic are even above the “whole of mathematics” in case this can make
>>> sense.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Mechanism is a form of processing that cannot be defined by
>> arithmetical+hyperarithmetical processing?
>>
>>
>> (By arithmetical processing I just mean Turing-machine processing of
>> course. Hyperarithmetical processing is being able to perform - if needed!
>> - infinitely iterated Turing jumps
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump>.)
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> You have referred to a kind of numerical processing (for consciousness)
> that balloons beyond even hyperarithmetic. That's where I lose that thread.
> But matter is a mystery too, but it's there (as our brains).
>
>
>
> I agree that there is a lot of evidence for matter, but I don’t see any
> evidence that matter is irreducible, or not a (persistent) illusion of some
> sort.
> Soul, knowledge, like truth, are not rigorously definable (by machines and
> men). That is a subtle point, often not well explained in textbook of
> mathematical logic, alas. A good effort is made by Torkel Franzen in his
> remarkable book “Inexhaustibility” (Association for Symbolic Logic, 2004).
> We can come back on this later. It is harder than the intuitive theory of
> combinators, which I might use to throw some light on this.
>
> Bruno
>
>
The history of (the evolution of the concept of) matter is interesting.
("New Materialism" is now an art movement*.)
I was reading how Thomas Aquinas adopted and modified Aristotle's
*hylomorphism* (form|matter). One aspect of Aquinas (I'm not a Thomist) is
something like he said matter was needed to make fine distinctions between
particulars: individuals (different horses, cats, trees, whatevers).
* "With the increasing presence of *'new materialism'* in contemporary art
..."
https://visual.artshub.com.au/whats-on/melbourne/exhibitions-visual/winsome-spiller-artists-talk-233309
- pt
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