On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical >>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before >>>> humans, >>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time >>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>> >>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in >>> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language >>> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”. >>> >>> >>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as >>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars. >>> >>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical >>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, >>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material >>> reality …. >>> >>> >>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any >>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical >>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to >>> see this. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …) >>> >>> >>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism. >>> >>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or >>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that >>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for >>> centuries. >>> >>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was >>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps >>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt >>> this too. >>> >>> >>> >>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], >>> written by Mark Balaguer [ >>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ]. >>> >>> >>> >>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime >>> that there is a moon. >>> >>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory >>> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. >>> >>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an >>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of >>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short. >>> >>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are >>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, >>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The >>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, >>> is a normal happening in arithmetic. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in >> mathematics at some level of language: >> >> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the >> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth >> value, Rutgers, March 2013* >> >> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/ >> >> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as >> "reduction to physics: >> >> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018) >> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ >> >> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism: >> >> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which >> the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they >> are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at >> some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. >> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking >> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the >> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the >> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor >> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and >> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible >> from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has >> grown up around the relation between these views." >> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism >> >> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing. >> >> >> Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By >> materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. Then, depending on how >> people define “primary matter”, this can be related with physicalisme. >> Physicalism is the doctrine that all science are reducible in principle to >> physics. >> >> All this is not so important, as Digital Mechanism makes even very weak >> form of materialism and physicalism dubious. Mechanism leads to a reductive >> ontology (what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …), but prevent any >> effective reductionism of the phenomenologies. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > > *Codicalism* (all matter has codicality) is a variant of hylomorphism. > There is just matter, not a "pre" or "prime" or "primal" matter. > > https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism > > http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf > > > The objection i raise to a purely information (numbers) processing > reality: One can get all possible physics (or any science) theories out of > it, and all modal agent (self-references, beliefs, intentions) languages, > but the theories and languages are not the things. > > > > I agree with this. With mechanism, reality, whatever it is, is not pure > information processing. Note that elementary arithmetic is already quite > above what is accessible by information processing, and the > phenomenological physical reality inherit that non computable aspect. > On the century matter and physics emerges from one unique sum on all > computations. It has to be the same physics for all machine. Physics > becomes theory and machine independent. > > > > > One needs experience processing. Matter is the only candidate to substrate > both information and experience processing. > > > Experience processing is explained by the relation between information > processing and truth, which is above all form of information processing. > > Matter? I don’t know what it is, unless you mean what we observe, but up > to know, machines observe the same matter, in a reality which dos not > assume its primitive, ontological existence. > > Bruno > > > By "information processing" I include all possible arithmetical *and* *hyperarithmetical *[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ] (what other arithmetic is there beyond all that?) processing.
But experience (consciousness) is outside all of that (Galen Strawson). - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
