On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 4:30:00 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical >>>>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before >>>>>> humans, >>>>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of >>>>>> time >>>>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or >>>>>> yesterday. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers >>>>> in the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a >>>>> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) >>>>> as true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars. >>>>> >>>>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical >>>>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, >>>>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call >>>>> material reality …. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of >>>>> any language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the >>>>> combinatorical reality, which is independent of language too, but it >>>>> might >>>>> be harder to see this. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or >>>>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact >>>>> that >>>>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for >>>>> centuries. >>>>> >>>>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was >>>>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps >>>>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I >>>>> doubt >>>>> this too. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], >>>>> written by Mark Balaguer [ >>>>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ]. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is >>>>> prime that there is a moon. >>>>> >>>>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a >>>>> theory in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an >>>>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of >>>>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are >>>>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary >>>>> test, >>>>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The >>>>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, >>>>> is a normal happening in arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in >>>> mathematics at some level of language: >>>> >>>> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the >>>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth >>>> value, Rutgers, March 2013* >>>> >>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/ >>>> >>>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as >>>> "reduction to physics: >>>> >>>> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018) >>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ >>>> >>>> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism: >>>> >>>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which >>>> the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they >>>> are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at >>>> some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. >>>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking >>>> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the >>>> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the >>>> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor >>>> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and >>>> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are >>>> invisible >>>> from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has >>>> grown up around the relation between these views." >>>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism >>>> >>>> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing. >>>> >>>> >>>> Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By >>>> materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. Then, depending on how >>>> people define “primary matter”, this can be related with physicalisme. >>>> Physicalism is the doctrine that all science are reducible in principle to >>>> physics. >>>> >>>> All this is not so important, as Digital Mechanism makes even very weak >>>> form of materialism and physicalism dubious. Mechanism leads to a >>>> reductive >>>> ontology (what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …), but prevent any >>>> effective reductionism of the phenomenologies. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> *Codicalism* (all matter has codicality) is a variant of hylomorphism. >>> There is just matter, not a "pre" or "prime" or "primal" matter. >>> >>> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism >>> >>> http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf >>> >>> >>> The objection i raise to a purely information (numbers) processing >>> reality: One can get all possible physics (or any science) theories out of >>> it, and all modal agent (self-references, beliefs, intentions) languages, >>> but the theories and languages are not the things. >>> >>> >>> >>> I agree with this. With mechanism, reality, whatever it is, is not pure >>> information processing. Note that elementary arithmetic is already quite >>> above what is accessible by information processing, and the >>> phenomenological physical reality inherit that non computable aspect. >>> On the century matter and physics emerges from one unique sum on all >>> computations. It has to be the same physics for all machine. Physics >>> becomes theory and machine independent. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> One needs experience processing. Matter is the only candidate to >>> substrate both information and experience processing. >>> >>> >>> Experience processing is explained by the relation between information >>> processing and truth, which is above all form of information processing. >>> >>> Matter? I don’t know what it is, unless you mean what we observe, but up >>> to know, machines observe the same matter, in a reality which dos not >>> assume its primitive, ontological existence. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> By "information processing" I include all possible arithmetical *and* >> *hyperarithmetical >> *[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ] (what other >> arithmetic is there beyond all that?) processing. >> >> >> That is way above Mechanism. I can understand the need if you want some >> primitive matter to exist, but that will not be enough, I think. >> > > > What arithmetical processing is there beyond even hyperarithmetical > processing? But in any case, arithmetical + hyperarithmetical processing > does not cover implementation of phenomenal experience (i.e. > consciousness). For that, a material substate is needed. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> But experience (consciousness) is outside all of that (Galen Strawson). >> >> >> That is true with mechanism too. The internal phenomenologies in >> arithmetic are even above the “whole of mathematics” in case this can make >> sense. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > Mechanism is a form of processing that cannot be defined by > arithmetical+hyperarithmetical processing? > > > (By arithmetical processing I just mean Turing-machine processing of > course. Hyperarithmetical processing is being able to perform - if needed! > - infinitely iterated Turing jumps > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump>.) > > - pt >
You have referred to a kind of numerical processing (for consciousness) that balloons beyond even hyperarithmetic. That's where I lose that thread. But matter is a mystery too, but it's there (as our brains). - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
