On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical >>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, >>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time >>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >> >> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in >> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language >> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”. >> >> >> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as >> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars. >> >> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical >> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, >> which just means false (assuming Mechanism). >> >> >> >> >> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material >> reality …. >> >> >> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any >> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical >> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to >> see this. >> >> >> >> >> >> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …) >> >> >> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism. >> >> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or >> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that >> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for >> centuries. >> >> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was >> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps >> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt >> this too. >> >> >> >> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], >> written by Mark Balaguer [ >> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ]. >> >> >> >> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime >> that there is a moon. >> >> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory >> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. >> >> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an >> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of >> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short. >> >> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are >> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, >> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The >> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, >> is a normal happening in arithmetic. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in > mathematics at some level of language: > > *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the > question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth > value, Rutgers, March 2013* > > http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/ > > As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as > "reduction to physics: > > *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018) > http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ > > *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism: > > "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the > objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are > genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some > other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. > Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking > the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the > existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the > terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor > influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and > explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible > from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has > grown up around the relation between these views." > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism > > Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing. > > > Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By > materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. Then, depending on how > people define “primary matter”, this can be related with physicalisme. > Physicalism is the doctrine that all science are reducible in principle to > physics. > > All this is not so important, as Digital Mechanism makes even very weak > form of materialism and physicalism dubious. Mechanism leads to a reductive > ontology (what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …), but prevent any > effective reductionism of the phenomenologies. > > Bruno > > >
*Codicalism* (all matter has codicality) is a variant of hylomorphism. There is just matter, not a "pre" or "prime" or "primal" matter. https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf The objection i raise to a purely information (numbers) processing reality: One can get all possible physics (or any science) theories out of it, and all modal agent (self-references, beliefs, intentions) languages, but the theories and languages are not the things. One needs experience processing. Matter is the only candidate to substrate both information and experience processing. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
