On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical >>>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before >>>>> humans, >>>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time >>>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or >>>>> yesterday. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers >>>> in the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a >>>> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”. >>>> >>>> >>>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as >>>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars. >>>> >>>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical >>>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, >>>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call >>>> material reality …. >>>> >>>> >>>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any >>>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical >>>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to >>>> see this. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …) >>>> >>>> >>>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism. >>>> >>>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or >>>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that >>>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for >>>> centuries. >>>> >>>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was >>>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps >>>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I >>>> doubt >>>> this too. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], >>>> written by Mark Balaguer [ >>>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ]. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime >>>> that there is a moon. >>>> >>>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a >>>> theory in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. >>>> >>>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an >>>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of >>>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short. >>>> >>>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are >>>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary >>>> test, >>>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The >>>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, >>>> is a normal happening in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in >>> mathematics at some level of language: >>> >>> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the >>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth >>> value, Rutgers, March 2013* >>> >>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/ >>> >>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as >>> "reduction to physics: >>> >>> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018) >>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ >>> >>> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism: >>> >>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which >>> the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they >>> are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at >>> some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. >>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking >>> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the >>> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the >>> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor >>> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and >>> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible >>> from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has >>> grown up around the relation between these views." >>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism >>> >>> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing. >>> >>> >>> Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By >>> materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. Then, depending on how >>> people define “primary matter”, this can be related with physicalisme. >>> Physicalism is the doctrine that all science are reducible in principle to >>> physics. >>> >>> All this is not so important, as Digital Mechanism makes even very weak >>> form of materialism and physicalism dubious. Mechanism leads to a reductive >>> ontology (what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …), but prevent any >>> effective reductionism of the phenomenologies. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> *Codicalism* (all matter has codicality) is a variant of hylomorphism. >> There is just matter, not a "pre" or "prime" or "primal" matter. >> >> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism >> >> http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2.Kinds.Matter.in.Aristotle.pdf >> >> >> The objection i raise to a purely information (numbers) processing >> reality: One can get all possible physics (or any science) theories out of >> it, and all modal agent (self-references, beliefs, intentions) languages, >> but the theories and languages are not the things. >> >> >> >> I agree with this. With mechanism, reality, whatever it is, is not pure >> information processing. Note that elementary arithmetic is already quite >> above what is accessible by information processing, and the >> phenomenological physical reality inherit that non computable aspect. >> On the century matter and physics emerges from one unique sum on all >> computations. It has to be the same physics for all machine. Physics >> becomes theory and machine independent. >> >> >> >> >> One needs experience processing. Matter is the only candidate to >> substrate both information and experience processing. >> >> >> Experience processing is explained by the relation between information >> processing and truth, which is above all form of information processing. >> >> Matter? I don’t know what it is, unless you mean what we observe, but up >> to know, machines observe the same matter, in a reality which dos not >> assume its primitive, ontological existence. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > By "information processing" I include all possible arithmetical *and* > *hyperarithmetical > *[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperarithmetical_theory ] (what other > arithmetic is there beyond all that?) processing. > > > That is way above Mechanism. I can understand the need if you want some > primitive matter to exist, but that will not be enough, I think. >
What arithmetical processing is there beyond even hyperarithmetical processing? But in any case, arithmetical + hyperarithmetical processing does not cover implementation of phenomenal experience (i.e. consciousness). For that, a material substate is needed. > > > > > > But experience (consciousness) is outside all of that (Galen Strawson). > > > That is true with mechanism too. The internal phenomenologies in > arithmetic are even above the “whole of mathematics” in case this can make > sense. > > Bruno > > > Mechanism is a form of processing that cannot be defined by arithmetical+hyperarithmetical processing? (By arithmetical processing I just mean Turing-machine processing of course. Hyperarithmetical processing is being able to perform - if needed! - infinitely iterated Turing jumps <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump>.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
