On 11/27/2018 2:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Dennett's said:
“/The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the
painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion/.”
The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false,
the trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a
misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that
needs no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things
would be different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer
that, and I don't think he could, then the statement "pain is a
illusion" contains no information.
And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness
is an illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which,
although true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any
philosophical issue the word "illusion" should be used very
cautiously. And if the topic involves consciousness or quala and
silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" should never be used
at all because it explains nothing.
That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc.
For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an
illusion, but the primary matter that we infer
What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? molecules? atoms?
quarks? strings? Who is it who every claims any one of these is
"primary"? What theory depends on one of them being primary? I think
you are beating a straw man to imply that others theories are wrong
therefore yours must be right.
Brent
from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just
a wrong inference, as most illusion are.
Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of
consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong.
Bruno
John K Clark
//
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