> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 11/27/2018 2:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Dennett's said: >>> >>> “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the >>> painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.” >>> >>> The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the >>> trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a >>> misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs >>> no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be >>> different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't >>> think he could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no >>> information. >>> >>> And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an >>> illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although >>> true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the >>> word "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves >>> consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" >>> should never be used at all because it explains nothing. >> >> That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc. >> >> For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an illusion, but >> the primary matter that we infer > > What is this "primary matter" of which you speak?
X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged enough equivalent). The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. > molecules? Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and electrons, and quantum mechanics. > atoms? quarks? strings? Strings might be close to a notion of primary matter, except it is nt clear if they are conceived of being made by something, and it is also open, for most physicists, if they are primitive of not. The notion of primary matter is typically not a physical notion, but a metaphysical one. To solve the problem which came first, mind or matter, it is obvious we cannot decide in advance the solution. > Who is it who every claims any one of these is "primary”? The (weak) materialist metaphysician. Like those who says that a computation needs to be implemented in some primitive physical reality to exist. They adopt Aristotle assumption about some ontological physical reality. Most physicists, as any good scientists, are neutral on this. Some proposes their own opinion, after pension, or at some dinner when drunk. But physics and metaphysics are not the same branche of inquiry, even if related of course. > What theory depends on one of them being primary? Many people says that there is no after-life. They use the mind-brain identity principle, usually in some materialist context, so that when the brain perish, they believe that their first person stop to exist in some absolute way. With mechanism, like with Everett QM, that conclusion does not follow. > I think you are beating a straw man to imply that others theories are wrong > therefore yours must be right. I never claim that a theory is right or wrong. I show only that the Mechanist theory implies immaterialism, and I explain how to recover physics phenomenologically, and how we can test that, and why the current empirical evidences favours more mechanism than materialism. Bruno > > Brent > >> from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just a >> wrong inference, as most illusion are. >> >> Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of >> consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong. >> >> Bruno >> >> >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
