> On 22 Nov 2018, at 21:02, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 4:44 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >In logic, a model is a reality. > > If so then "reality" is a very silly thing and logicians are very silly > people.
It is so, as again you would see if you read any introduction to mathematical logic. A model is usually an infinite structure, quite different from a theory, and semantics is given by a “satisfaction” relation between models and formula. The model of Peano arithmetic, for example, is the set N together with the addition and multiplication functions intepreteting the symbol “+” and “*” in the usual sense. > > > A reality is anything which satisfies a theory > > And that is a very silly thing to say. Harry Potter flying on a broom > satisfies the theory that Harry Potter is a wizard therefore Harry Potter > flying on a broom is a reality. > > > By definition of computations, all computations are done without primary > > matter. > > And there we have those magical words again "by definition” . Yes, in a precise context, when doing science/mathematics, it is useful to have precise mathematical definition. > You should just say that "correct" means what Bruno Marchal says and > therefore all your ideas are "correct" by definition. No I use the standard definition. You are wanting to change them to suit your personal agenda, which does not seem to “understand” the works already done, so as to avoid the consequences. You define computation through an ontological commitment. That is not the standard way to proceed in this field, and well, in science in general. > Definitions do not change reality and you're never going to discover anything > new just by making definitions. Any formal or mathematical definition will do, and with Church thesis this applies to any possible different future definition. That all computations are executed in arithmetic is just a standard fact knows since 1931-1936. > > > The appearance of matter is explained by the way some computations are seen > > from inside. > > Computations don't seem like anything from the inside or the outside if they > don't exist, and without matter that obeys the laws of physics they don’t; You assume Aristotle theology. That simply cannot work, unless you are right about the non existence of the first person indeterminacy, but you have failed to give an algorithm capable of violating it, so ... > and even the magical incantation "by definition" can't change that fact. > > > If you believe in some primary, non deductible matter and that such primary > > matter has a role for consciousness, > > We've observed experimentally that a change in matter changes consciousness > and a change in consciousness changes matter, I don't see how you could get > better evidence than that indicating matter and consciousness are related. In a video games, you can also have such relations, them being processed in the physical reality, or in a brain in a vat, or in arithmetic, the same effect can take place, and thus, what you say cannot be a valid argument for the existence of a primary matter playing a role in the brain, or in consciousness. > > > it is up to you to explain how > > It is not necessary to explain how if you can prove that it does. It would work if your brain was unique, but there is no reason to believe this, and it is refutable with Mechanism, as they are infinitely many “brains” in arithmetic. > In science if someone makes a experimental discovery they are not also > required to explain why things are that way, if they can that would be great > but it's not required. In 1998 astronomers discovered that the universe was > accelerating, they had no idea why it is doing that and we still don't, but > the astronomers received the Nobel for their discovery anyway. When somebody > discovers why its accelerating I have no doubt another Nobel Prize will be > produced. You identify physics and metaphysics. That is not valid. > > > that matter can select computation(s) in arithmetic. > > Turing showed that matter can make any computation that can be composted, > what more do you need. Sure, but we talk on primary matter, and it is this one that you have to explain the role in consciousness, and how it select the computations in arithmetic, or what it does not select them, which seems pure magic. You cannot invoke your personal conviction, as you did above and in other posts. > > > either A) that matter role is not Turing emulable, but then mechanism is > > false. Or, > > You've got it backwards. Again. Turing proved that matter can do mathematics > he did NOT prove that mathematics can do matter, Yes, that is my result, but it is based on Turing’s definition of computation, based on its thesis or on Church’s thesis. > and as far back as Newton we knew that mathematics can not solve the 3 body > problem exactly and it can't even get arbitrarily close to the correct > solution. So if you want to know what 3 objects of equal mass in orbit around > each other will do all you can do is watch it and see. But that is still partial computable. No problem, in arithmetic there are infinitely any processes that we cannot predict in advance. > If there are a million objects in orbit you can make a pretty good > approximation about what the entire swarm will do but not what any individual > object will do. And with quantum physics it has become even more apparent > that probabilities are the best that mathematics can do when it tries to > emulate physics. > > > Neither English nor mathematics are defined precisely enough to assert that > > there are Turing universal. > > Neither Mathematics or English or any other language will ever be Turing > universal, but matter is not a language and we've known since 1936 that it is > Turing universal. You insist confusing the language of mathematics and the object talked about using that language. You were more open-minded on this some years ago. I don’t see why. Gödel’s theorem refutes the idea that conventionalism is true in mathematics. > > > Gödel’s theorem says nothing about the physical, > > True, but Turing has a great deal to say about the physical, he said > everything can be translated into something physical and in fact the physical > is all he talked about. In its embryogenesis paper, or in its note on the quantum Zeno effect, not in its paper on computations, which he made clear to be mathematical, and later arithmetical. > Historically Godel's theorem came a few years before Turing's but it could > have easily been the other way around. Turing's results are far more general > than Godel's, in 1936 Turing of course knew of Godel's work in 1931 but it > didn't help him much, but if he had never been born Turing could have proven > Godel's results as a corollary that was vastly simpler than the method Godel > originallyly used to prove it. > > Suppose we had a consistent and complete logical system which was powerful > enough to do arithmetic. Now if we have any Turing machine, we can figure > out if it halts on any given input tape. Because the logical system is > consistent and complete there must be a proof of finite size that it will > halt or a proof that it will not, so all we'd have to do is go through them > one by one till we found it; it would only take a finite amount of time and > when and we've found the proof or disproof we've solved the Halting Problem. > But it you already know that the Halting Problem can't be solved (which in > 1936 Turing did know) then you'd know that a logical system that was > consistent and complete and powerful enough to do arithmetic could not exist. > > > If you read the whole paper (sane04), > > Reading the entire paper is not necessary, one does not need to eat the > entire egg to know it is bad. You need to show the error, in a convincing polite way. Up to now, you have deliberately avoid this. > > > you can have the gist of it, even if you have some doubt on some steps, on > > which we can come back. > > I will not read another word of it until you fix the blunder in step 3, and I > don't think you ever will. What error? You found none. You have just rephrase the problem and said it was nonsense, but each time you are using improper definitions, and abstract from the 1p and 3p distinctions. I will perhaps send a ost on that step 3, and ask the newbees. The last time I did that, none did understood your point. > > >>Without matter there would be no way for that information to be encoded, > > > x encodes phi_x in arithmetic through the Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z). > > Mr. Kleene was made of matter and he wrote "T(x, y, z)" in ink which was also > made of matter. Sure, but that does not make that matter primary. But it illustrates that computations are arithmetical object. > > > You cannot know by pure introspection if you are in a brain in a vat, or a > > brain in arithmetic. > > But you claim to have done precisely that, you claim that everything, and not > just brains, at the deepest level is just arithmetic. I did not do that by introspection. I claim nothing. I just show that IF mechanism is True, then we can test it empirically (not by introspection), and that the test done confirm immaterialism, not materialism. > > > when doing metaphysics with the scientific method [...] > > As I said before, if you're doing metaphysics with the scientific method then > its not metaphysics, it's just physics. That is wrong. Doing metaphysics with the scientific attitude consists in NOT deciding the ontology at the start. > What you're doing is definitely metaphysics, I prefer physics. Then why do you try to intervene in a discussion in metaphysics. This list is not a physics list, but a list on the subject of how to unify everything, which includes consciousness, god or not gods, etc. You prefer physics, but that is not a reason to use it as if it was a metaphysics. You can do that, of course: it is Aristotle theology, and it is refuted by the facts today. > > > Are you able to doubt the ontological existence of a physical universe? > > Depends on what you mean. I would say a physical universe is a place with the > capacity to build a working Turing Machine, even if we're living in a > computer simulation I have no doubt such a place exists. Amen. If you have no doubt, then there is nothing we can do. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
