> On 10 Dec 2018, at 08:38, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > I think truth is primitive. > > Jason > > > As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy), truth and matter are linked: > > "As a matter of fact, ..." > "The truth of the matter is ..." > "It matters that ..." > ... > [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter > <https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter> ] > > I agree they are linked. Though matter may be a few steps removed from > truth. Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly: > > There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be > true, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its variables) > maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave function of > our universe. You might say that we (literally not figuratively) live within > such an equation. That its truth reifies what we call matter. > > But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this. e.g. > because the following statement is true "two has a successor" then there > exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number. Similarly, the > truth of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 > and 9. > > Jason > > > > > Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has material truth if its concepts are > based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a > judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called > logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure > science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, > empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth." > [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth> ] > > > I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the integers > is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see around us. > > Jason > > > > In my view there is basically just material (from matter) truth and > linguistic (from language) truth. > > [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ > <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/> ] > > Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , > functional type theory (FTT) languages. > > Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of Peano > arithmetic (PA). > > Numbers can be "materialized" via nominalization (cf. Hartry Field, refs. in > [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field> ]). > > > Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less, than assuming > the primacy of arithmetical truth. > > Jason > > > > In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins > <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins>) has shown there is a "multiverse" of truths: > > The set-theoretic multiverse > [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 ] > > The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, > is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated > in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, > asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a > corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic > question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains > our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a > phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the > continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive > knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no > longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. > > > What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth depends > on the language.
Then in my language “truth depends on the language” is false. But it is not in my language, it is in my understanding of the word involve. I can understand that the taste of coffee depends on the country in which I drink the coffee, but I doubt the language has any role there, although its structure might be correlated by common causes. I would say that truth, and even mind, are independent of the languages and theories. Theories are only mind-tool to explore truth and mind, and guess it is bigger than us, and contains elements above theories and even above language, like truth for PA, which is not definable by PA. Now, set theory is nice for the phenomenology, but far to big for the ontology. The axiom of infinity does not make PA inconsistent, but it makes Mechanism predicting too much, and the physics get wrong. The critics by Quine against modal logic (and against metaphysics) get correct for the too much rich universal machine, which believes in actual (ontological) infinity. What many people miss is the 1p 3p distinctions in the “all computations” 3p constructive picture, which is everything but constructive from the 1p experiential view. Hamkins approach makes sense if you replaced the set notion by hereditary finite set notion, but then that is recursively equivalent to arithmetic. Bruno > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
