On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:38 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett < >>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> From: Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept >>>>>>>> of the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a >>>>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> What exists? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time >>>>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes) >>>>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time, >>>>>>> each in their own present time >>>>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A. But I struggle to see the >>>>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are >>>>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I >>>>>>> don't think you are though). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One >>>>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one >>>>>>> proton...... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local >>>>>>> "present" is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, >>>>>>> external time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of >>>>>>> "block time" in C above makes precisely this mistake. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the >>>>>> notion of the present as a global space-like hyperplane. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists >>>>> timelessly because that is incoherent. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> So what defines this the set of present moments? Does it include all >>>> events in spacetime? Or only some of them? >>>> >>> >>> Why would you leave any out? >>> >>> >> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all >> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only >> that all points in time exist and are real)? >> > > They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one > proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and > simultaneously. As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of > simultaneity, the notion is incoherent. > > Why is it incoherent? What does moments popping out of existence do to make the conception more coherent? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
