> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:32, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 4:45:35 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 Dec 2018, at 18:59, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 12:18:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, [email protected] <> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, [email protected] <> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote: > > But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We > know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will > be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of > theorems. > > Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic > theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG > > Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you referred > to are broad principles, not axioms. > > That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic. > > Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general > principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining > these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory > on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG > > I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that most > logicians use that term. > > An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG > > That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is just a > formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a priori. > > IMO, your comment, while possibly true in a technical sense, is just > obfuscating BS. For example, for non relativistic QM, we assume > Schroedinger's equation is "true", or correctly represents how the wf > evolves. Give me a break. AG > > The whole point of doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific attitude > would consist in understanding that this kind of nuance and definition are > not obfuscating anything. On the contrary, they help to be more clear, and to > prevent the use of metaphysical biases. > > When doing physics, we can assume informally that the SWE is correct, but > when doing Mechanist metaphysics, we can’t, > > Why not? It's a good hypothesis or axiom that correctly predicts the behavior > of the wf (for non relativistic QM). What would you replace it with? AG
It does it well FAPP, but to relate it to the first person experience, it uses an identity brain-mind which is invalid when we assume mechanism. So physics uses an implicit reference to an ontological commitment, involving infinities for which we have no evidence, and which would contradicts most known theories, from evolution to QM. It is the point of the UDA reasoning. I do not claim this is entirely obvious. Physics works well, but it cannot predict anything if we assume mechanism, the laws must be derived in a certain way so at to get the correct type of supervenience on mind on computations allowed by computer science/arithmetic. With mechanism, we must use any Turing complete theory, minus induction axioms, and minus infinity axioms. We must derive the SWE (assuming it physically correct) from the statistics on all computations. Invoking a “real matter” does not work better than invoking “God” or something. It just does not work. If you predict an eclipse, you still cannot predict you will feel to see an eclipse, as you would need to assume absence of Boltzman Brain in the universe … and in arithmetic, but that is not possible: they are there. Bruno > > and this is just an example, so it helps to use the terms with they standard > meaning in science, and not with imprecise meanings which usually only hides > the (open) problems. > > > > I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter) > logician sense for physics. > > Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure "for > physics". AG > > They failed, > > It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a > general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG > > Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still not > abstracted from some metaphysical commitment. > By separating science and religion, physics tends to be confused with > metaphysics. Some posts in this list confirms this. > > Most physicists are not confused as you allege. > > I agree. That is why I insist that there is no problem with physics or with > physicists. I make clear that the problem is with metaphysics. The > Aristotelian metaphysics is wrong. Now, some people are good in physics, but > are not even aware that the confusion between physics and metaphysics ïs* the > main axiom of the Aristotelian theology (with or without an important or > trivial notion of first god, matter being the second god, but still the main > one for the aristotelians (believer in primary matter, or physicalists). > > The problem is not physics, but physicalism; when we assume the Mechanist > hypothesis. > > > > > > IMO, this line of discussion is just an effort to create strawmen. AG > > > No. It is fact that the God/Non-God debate hides the original question of > scientific theology: is there a universe existing fundamentally, in need to > be assumed or in need of faith (like the Aristotelian think), or is the > physical universe a symptom of a deeper non physical reality (like > Pythagorus, Plato, …). > > Physics is neutral on this; but physicalism is the Aristotelian theological > axiom. No problem, unless it used as a dogma for not testing simpler theories. > > Mechanism works. Physicalism do not, at least with Mechanism. > > Mechanism explains why there is an apparent universe, but also why its > mathematics split into a sharable theory of sharable quanta, and a partially > sharable theory o > ... > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
