On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 4:45:35 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 22 Dec 2018, at 18:59, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote:
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> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 12:18:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, [email protected] wrote:
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> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, [email protected] wrote:
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> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
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> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
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> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
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> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. 
> We know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there 
> will be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation 
> of theorems.
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> *Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic 
> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG*
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> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you 
> referred to are broad principles, not axioms.
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> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic. 
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> *Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general 
> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining 
> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory 
> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG*
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> I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that 
> most logicians use that term.
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> *An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG*
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> That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is just 
> a formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a priori.
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> *IMO, your comment, while possibly true in a technical sense, is just 
> obfuscating BS. For example, for non relativistic QM, we assume 
> Schroedinger's equation is "true", or correctly represents how the wf 
> evolves. Give me a break. AG *
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> The whole point of doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific 
> attitude would consist in understanding that this kind of nuance and 
> definition are not obfuscating anything. On the contrary, they help to be 
> more clear, and to prevent the use of metaphysical biases.
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> When doing physics, we can assume informally that the SWE is correct, but 
> when doing Mechanist metaphysics, we can’t,
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*Why not? It's a good hypothesis or axiom that correctly predicts the 
behavior of the wf (for non relativistic QM). What would you replace it 
with? AG*

and this is just an example, so it helps to use the terms with they 
> standard meaning in science, and not with imprecise meanings which usually 
> only hides the (open) problems.
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> I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter) 
> logician sense for physics. 
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> *Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure 
> "for physics". AG *
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> They failed,
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> *It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a 
> general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG *
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> Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still not 
> abstracted from some metaphysical commitment.
> By separating science and religion, physics tends to be confused with 
> metaphysics. Some posts in this list confirms this.  
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> *Most physicists are not confused as you allege. *
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> I agree. That is why I insist that there is no problem with physics or 
> with physicists. I make clear that the problem is with metaphysics. The 
> Aristotelian metaphysics is wrong. Now, some people are good in physics, 
> but are not even aware that the confusion between physics and metaphysics 
> ïs* the main axiom of the Aristotelian theology (with or without an 
> important or trivial notion of first god, matter being the second god, but 
> still the main one for the aristotelians (believer in primary matter, or 
> physicalists).
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> The problem is not physics, but physicalism; when we assume the Mechanist 
> hypothesis.
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> *IMO, this line of discussion is just an effort to create strawmen. AG *
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> No. It is fact that the God/Non-God debate hides the original question of 
> scientific theology: is there a universe existing fundamentally, in need to 
> be assumed or in need of faith (like the Aristotelian think), or is the 
> physical universe a symptom of a deeper non physical reality (like 
> Pythagorus, Plato, …).
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> Physics is neutral on this; but physicalism is the Aristotelian 
> theological axiom. No problem, unless it used as a dogma for not testing 
> simpler theories.
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> Mechanism works. Physicalism do not, at least with Mechanism.
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> Mechanism explains why there is an apparent universe, but also why its 
> mathematics split into a sharable theory of sharable quanta, and a 
> partially sharable theory o
> ...

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