On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 3:42:04 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Dec 2018, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > The universe we see is the only one for which we have any concrete > evidence, and that evidence is indubitable. > > > That is of course a strong evidence for a physical reality, but unless we > buy the Aristotelian theology, “seeing” is not an evidence for a > metaphysical reality. > > I think the whole problem is here: a confusion for the evidence for > physics with an evidence for a metaphysics. This has worked for 1500 years, > only by terror, violence, and then habits, and the constant hiding of the > (mind-body) problem under the rug (notably through “fairy tales”). > > Physics is a wonderful science, but to make physics systematically, > without argument nor evidence, into a metaphysics is a form of “modern” > charlatanism, when made consciously, and still a form of obscurantism when > done by ignorance. With science, doubts are mandatory. > > Bruno >
Physics (a collection of "accepted" formulated [in mathematical language] theories - the Standard Model, General Relativity - and "pending" ones - string theory, cosmic inflation, loop quantum gravity...) is a type of fictionalism. But is a different "genre" of fiction than mathematics. *Fictions, Inference, and Realism* Mauricio Suárez http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5013/1/Fictions%2C_Inference%2C_and_Realism.pdf Abstract: *It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterized, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favor nor against scientific realism.* - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
