On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> ...
>
> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka
> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the initial
> theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of
> theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which
> universal machinery we talk about).
>
> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states.
> All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>
>
> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>
>
> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed
> into classical logic,
>
>
> No.  It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted
> the logic of physics collapsed.  Which would have been bad for  your
> theory, but would have had no effect on physics.
>
> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that
> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories
> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty.
> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the
> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non
> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities
> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the
> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that
> “observable” view point.
>
>
> But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd
> say are trivial.
>
>
> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine
> (in the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural
> indeterminacy on all relative computations.
>
> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming
> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just
> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations”
>
>
> But what does it mean to "sum on all computations"?
>
> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions.
>
>
> What is an observation in these computations?
>
> If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the normal
> (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to prevent we got
> the right laws of physics (something rather absurde, and which requires an
> infinite work on the par of the liar).
>
> If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from the
> semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* logics), then
> it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown to be not derivable
> from them, then it is “geographical”, and some region of the
> “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one.
>
>
> That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception.
>
>
> The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves the
> quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws of
> physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the mathematics
> of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines.
>
> Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why group
> theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the unitary group
> imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one on a universal
> Turing structure. The particles are group invariants, so that light help to
> get the bosons and the fermions.
>
>
> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>

It's all just burble, Brent. He has no idea how to get any useful results
from any of this.......

Bruce

>

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