On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka
universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the
initial theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense
of theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on
which universal machinery we talk about).
Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its
states. All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical
and/or historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep
histories.
So what expectation has measure 1.0? Can you show that it includes
conservation of energy-momentum for example?
It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have
collapsed into classical logic,
No. It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted
the logic of physics collapsed. Which would have been bad for your
theory, but would have had no effect on physics.
for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in
that case there would be a infinite “landscape” of
geographies/histories possible, and the laws of physics would be
trivial somehow, that is empty. Thanks to incompleteness the logic of
physics (that is, the logic of the measure one on the sigma_1
sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non trivial logic quantum,
and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities are not trivial,
and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the leaves of the
UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that “observable”
view point.
But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd
say are trivial.
The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian)
machine (in the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person
plural indeterminacy on all relative computations.
That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false
(assuming that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation,
where we are just lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all
computations”
But what does it mean to "sum on all computations"?
with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions.
What is an observation in these computations?
If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the
normal (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to
prevent we got the right laws of physics (something rather absurde,
and which requires an infinite work on the par of the liar).
If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from
the semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*
logics), then it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown
to be not derivable from them, then it is “geographical”, and some
region of the “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one.
That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception.
The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves
the quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws
of physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the
mathematics of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines.
Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why
group theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the
unitary group imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one
on a universal Turing structure. The particles are group invariants,
so that light help to get the bosons and the fermions.
The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants. But how do Lorentz
transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
Brent
We can dig from all sides. The advantage of looking “in the head of
the universal machine” is that we benefit from the Gödel-Löb-Solovay
G/G* separation between proof and truth, and its inheritance in the
“material” hypostases, which explains a lot, I think, about the
relation between the qualia and the quanta, the sensible privately
knowable and the first person plural sharable.
Bruno
Jason
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