> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:20, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> ... >> >> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka universal >> machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the initial theory >> (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of theoretical >> computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which universal >> machinery we talk about). >> >> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the >> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states. All >> the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or >> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories. > > So what expectation has measure 1.0? Can you show that it includes > conservation of energy-momentum for example? > >> >> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed >> into classical logic, > > No. It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted the > logic of physics collapsed. Which would have been bad for your theory, but > would have had no effect on physics. > >> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that >> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories >> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty. >> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the >> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non >> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities >> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the >> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that >> “observable” view point. > > But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd say > are trivial. > >> >> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine (in >> the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural >> indeterminacy on all relative computations. >> >> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming >> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just >> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations” > > But what does it mean to "sum on all computations"? > >> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions. > > What is an observation in these computations? > >> If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the normal >> (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to prevent we got >> the right laws of physics (something rather absurde, and which requires an >> infinite work on the par of the liar). >> >> If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from the >> semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* logics), then >> it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown to be not derivable >> from them, then it is “geographical”, and some region of the >> “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one. > > That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception. > >> >> The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves the >> quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws of >> physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the mathematics >> of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines. >> >> Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why group >> theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the unitary group >> imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one on a universal >> Turing structure. The particles are group invariants, so that light help to >> get the bosons and the fermions. > > The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants. But how do Lorentz > transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)? > > It's all just burble, Brent. He has no idea how to get any useful results > from any of this…….
You would have study the papers, you would know that it is hard to give a more refutable theory than Mechanism. I recall and insist that you are the one, who like Clarck, invoke you ontological commitment, to evacuate a problem, and not testing a simple and general theory, which is not mine (it is already in Descartes, and even in antic text, just made mathematical by the Church Turing thesis). Just study and make specific critics, but it would be nice you could argue instead of mocking the theories which put some doubt on the faith in primitive Aristotelian matter. Physics works, but only by abstracting itself from the first person experience. I see Aristotle’s materialism as a brilliant simplifications, but even with contemporary physics, we see that it leads to difficulties, and then we can understand it does not make sense when we assume the digital mechanist hypothesis. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
