> On 23 Dec 2018, at 21:28, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 11:18:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 21 Dec 2018, at 19:05, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 11:12:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be <>> wrote: >>> >>> Is not 333’s oddness timeless? >>> >>> Category error. >>> >>> >>> >>> On category error: >>> >>> I've never understood "category error" [ >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake> ]. (Some philosopher I >>> read about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors. >>> Good.) >>> >>> Is 333's oddness timeless? is a perfectly reasonable question. >>> >>> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes". >>> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”. >> >> That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on time. >> But then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, and >> that requires clarification. >> >> >> >>> >>> It all depends. >>> >>> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and >>> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism >>> is just mixed-up confusion to me. >> >> And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That contradicts >> Mechanism. >> >> >>> >>> Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands in >>> contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic. >> >> The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness >> into an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. As >> I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being >> (especially if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion of >> consciousness to a piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital >> Mechanist frame, things get clearer and deeper. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> But in 2019: >> >> Out: Eliminative ("Mechanistic") Materialism > > You use “mechanism” in his pre-Gödelian reductionist sense. After Gödel, > reductionism is simply refuted, even the reductionist conception of numbers > and machine, to begin with. > > > >> In: Experiential Materialism >> >> "I think we need to radically rethink our understanding of matter in order >> to explain consciousness, > > > Sure. Mechanism attributes souls to "numbers-in-relations” and in a testable > way, as the laws of the observable are explained explicitly through them. > > And our understanding of matter is revised radically, as it becomes a product > of the universal differentiating consciousness of the universal (Turing) > numbers. > > > > >> in something like the way Einstein radically rethought the nature of space >> and time.” > > You can see Everett-Feynman generalising already Einstein on the quantum > reality, and Mechanism extends this idea on the whole arithmetical reality > (in which the Everett-Feynam part should appear, and seems to appear, as a > sort of border/projection. > > No need of design, no need of designer, just the arithmetical reality as seen > by the universal numbers of measure one minus epsilon. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> - Philip Goff [ http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/ >> <http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/> ] >> > > > > > If some higher-order Gödelian arithmetical process is involved in some sense > in the making of consciousness, then it's matter that is doing it.
I don’t see evidences for this, nor theoretical reason (other than the materialist ontological commitment, which is better to avoid in metaphysics when we apply the scientific method. > > Matter and Arithmetic are like Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers. Arithmetic is far less mysterious than mind and matter. For matter, we can say that modern physics has made it even more mysterious. If we want a primitive matter notion, it cannot be boolean (like the Aristotelian) one, and a non boolean primary matter is quite a bizarre notion. But with mechanism, a non boolean primary matter is expected and explained from elementary arithmetical proposition shared by al scientists. The idea is to start from what we agree on, adding as few assumptions as possible, to explain the complicated happenings, and this in way which can be tested. Bruno > > - pt > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
