> On 21 Dec 2018, at 19:05, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 11:12:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> Is not 333’s oddness timeless? >> >> Category error. >> >> >> >> On category error: >> >> I've never understood "category error" [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake> ]. (Some philosopher I read >> about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors. Good.) >> >> Is 333's oddness timeless? is a perfectly reasonable question. >> >> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes". >> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”. > > That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on time. > But then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, and that > requires clarification. > > > >> >> It all depends. >> >> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and >> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism >> is just mixed-up confusion to me. > > And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That contradicts > Mechanism. > > >> >> Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands in >> contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic. > > The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness into > an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. As I > said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being > (especially if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion of > consciousness to a piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital > Mechanist frame, things get clearer and deeper. > > Bruno > > > But in 2019: > > Out: Eliminative ("Mechanistic") Materialism
You use “mechanism” in his pre-Gödelian reductionist sense. After Gödel, reductionism is simply refuted, even the reductionist conception of numbers and machine, to begin with. > In: Experiential Materialism > > "I think we need to radically rethink our understanding of matter in order to > explain consciousness, Sure. Mechanism attributes souls to "numbers-in-relations” and in a testable way, as the laws of the observable are explained explicitly through them. And our understanding of matter is revised radically, as it becomes a product of the universal differentiating consciousness of the universal (Turing) numbers. > in something like the way Einstein radically rethought the nature of space > and time.” You can see Everett-Feynman generalising already Einstein on the quantum reality, and Mechanism extends this idea on the whole arithmetical reality (in which the Everett-Feynam part should appear, and seems to appear, as a sort of border/projection. No need of design, no need of designer, just the arithmetical reality as seen by the universal numbers of measure one minus epsilon. Bruno > > - Philip Goff [ http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/ ] > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
