On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 11:18:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Dec 2018, at 19:05, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 11:12:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Is not 333’s oddness timeless? >>> >>> >>> Category error. >>> >>> >>> >>> >> On category error: >> >> I've never understood "category error" [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake ]. (Some philosopher I >> read about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors. >> Good.) >> >> *Is 333's oddness timeless? *is a perfectly reasonable question. >> >> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes". >> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”. >> >> >> That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on >> time. But then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, >> and that requires clarification. >> >> >> >> >> It all depends. >> >> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and >> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism >> is just mixed-up confusion to me. >> >> >> And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That >> contradicts Mechanism. >> >> >> >> Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands >> in contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic. >> >> >> The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness >> into an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. >> As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious >> being (especially if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion >> of consciousness to a piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital >> Mechanist frame, things get clearer and deeper. >> >> Bruno >> >> > But in 2019: > > Out: Eliminative ("Mechanistic") Materialism > > > You use “mechanism” in his pre-Gödelian reductionist sense. After Gödel, > reductionism is simply refuted, even the reductionist conception of numbers > and machine, to begin with. > > > > In: Experiential Materialism > > "I think we need to radically rethink *our understanding of matter *in > order to explain consciousness, > > > > Sure. Mechanism attributes souls to "numbers-in-relations” and in a > testable way, as the laws of the observable are explained explicitly > through them. > > And our understanding of matter is revised radically, as it becomes a > product of the universal differentiating consciousness of the universal > (Turing) numbers. > > > > > in something like the way Einstein radically rethought the nature of space > and time.” > > > You can see Everett-Feynman generalising already Einstein on the quantum > reality, and Mechanism extends this idea on the whole arithmetical reality > (in which the Everett-Feynam part should appear, and seems to appear, as a > sort of border/projection. > > No need of design, no need of designer, just the arithmetical reality as > seen by the universal numbers of measure one minus epsilon. > > Bruno > > > > > > - Philip Goff [ http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/ ] > >
If some higher-order Gödelian arithmetical process is involved in some sense in the making of consciousness, then it's matter that is doing it. Matter and Arithmetic are like Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
