On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:57:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from >>> *information >>> processing.* >>> >>> >>> >>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information >>> processing is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. >>> It is the “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) >>> machine is aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own >>> correctness, and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between >>> []p and “[]p & p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the >>> soul or of the knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p >>> description. I would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” >>> processing. >>> >>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the >>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for >>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody >>> can define nor test. >>> >>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material >>> universal machine are equivalent with respect to computability and >>> emulability. Please note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to >>> provability, even if, when self-referentially correct, their provability >>> predicate will all obey to the same theology (G*), but will differ in their >>> interpretation, contents, etc. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ >>> >>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/ >>> >>> - pt >>> >>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) >> perspective, for experiential processing. >> >> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do >> with stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of >> "self" such that your self is a real thing >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing), >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't >> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that >> is doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing. >> >> >> >> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal >> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and >> free-will is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence >> of complete information. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference >> on Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 >> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ ] … >> >> >> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to >> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the >> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct >> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When >> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from >> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of >> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral >> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain >> brain, that sense is basically innate. >> >> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a >> body/code. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed > processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.) > > > Does biocomputing violate Church’s thesis? If yes, give me a biocomputable > function from N to N which is not Turing-computable. If no, then the > biocomputation are realised in arithmetic, and biology, like physics emerge > from a statistics on all those computations. That can be tested (and has > been). > > Bruno > > >
*Slime Mold Can Solve Exponentially Complicated Problems in Linear Time* http://www.sci-news.com/biology/slime-mold-problems-linear-time-06759.html - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
