> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:04:20 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>> 
>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
>> materialists.
> 
> 
> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence of 
> Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still physicalist 
> (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical reality would be a 
> mathematical reality among others, but with computationalism, the physical 
> reality comes from a more global mathematical phenomenon based on the 
> behaviour/semantics of the material mode of self-rereyence (involving 
> probabilities, i.e., for those who have studied the self-referential modes 
> available, the []p & X modes, with X being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
> 
> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, I 
> would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can mean 
> (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and physics is 
> what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
> 
> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by 
> physics.)
> 
> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both terms 
> ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will typically 
> refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ 
> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/>
> 
> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" (unless 
> it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to physics"), though 
> materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
> 
> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
> 
>     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4>
> 
> 
> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is whether 
> "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight the 
> difference:
> 
> 
> Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained or 
> derived from anything else):
> 
> 
> Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be explained 
> or derived from something more fundamental):
> 
> 
> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that 
> belief a "Primary Physicalism Agnostic".
> 
> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why it 
> is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence for 
> it.
> 
>  
> 
> 
> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
> 
> 
> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally 
> equivalent replacement and experience no change in consciousness.
> 
> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
> confirmation of digital mechanism.
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be 
> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  
> 
> See  List of unsolved problems in chemistry
> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry>
> 
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these open 
> problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not reducible to 
> physical properties.
> 
> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>  
> 
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does not 
> cover what is chemical (much less biological).
> 
> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter whether 
> everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
> 
> 
> 
> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally 
> equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include biomechanical (as 
> defined in synthetic biology), as there was no restriction of "mechanical".
> 
> 
> Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, regardless 
> of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that component is 
> functionally equivalent to the part replaced.  Mechanism is the belief held 
> by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, and there is no magic 
> in it.
> 
> Jason
>  
> 
> 
> 
> The concept of some theoretical chemists (vs. some theoretical physicists) is 
> that there are laws of chemistry that cannot be reduced to laws of physics. 
> Not that they 'violate' laws of physics. What physics governs still works.
> 
> Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just as 
> biological interactions are ultimately chemical.
>  
> 
> If 'function' (in "functionally equivalent") includes experiential as well as 
> just informational functionality, then that something else.
> 
> The brain is a machine: A biomachine. The human is a biocomputer:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer>
> 
> 
> But all computers are equivalent.
> 
> Jason
>  
> No problem there.
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> "Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just as 
> biological interactions are ultimately chemical."
> 
> That is a statement of faith (the list of "unsolved problems in chemistry" 
> above should bring some skepticism), almost like one would see in a church's 
> catechism.
> 
> 
> "Chemical" is a human invention to summarize and simplify natural laws 
> concerning larger systems of particles.  I don't know what it could mean to 
> say there is a chemical phenomenon which is not a result of natural laws.
> 
> You may say this is a statement of faith, but it is as much a statement of 
> faith to believe unsolved problems will be explained as the result of 
> chemicals (which again are just particles) are doing things their underlying 
> particles would not do on their own as particles.
>  
> See http://www.eoht.info/page/Anti-reductionism 
> <http://www.eoht.info/page/Anti-reductionism> on "anti-reductionism" and 
> those that are "skeptics" or the reductionist belief.
> 
> There are of course emergent phenomenon, like clouds and dogs. And I think it 
> is likely consciousness (as it is with a computation) is something that 
> cannot be not reduced and explained in terms of its parts.  But no one has 
> demonstrated a biological organism violating a chemical law, nor a chemical 
> reaction violating a physical law, just as in a large and complex 
> computation, at no time does this computation permit the CPU to do something 
> it should not.
>  
> 
> 
> "But all computers are equivalent."
> 
> See 
> 
> Call for Abstracts
> 
> The First International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Material 
> Computing (TEMC 2019)
> 
> 
> https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html
>  
> <https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html>
> 
> Material computing  exploits unconventional physical substrates and/or 
> unconventional computational models to perform physical computation in a 
> non-silicon and/or non-Turing paradigm.
> 
> 
> I think by "Non-Turning" they mean in a manner dissimilar to the architecture 
> of Turing's machines. In none of those unconventional computing paradigms is 
> it possible to compute anything that a Turing machine could not compute. If 
> there were it would be huge news as it would overturn one of the most widely 
> and deeply believed principals in computer science.
> 
> When someone says the mind or brain are computational, it is commonly 
> misunderstood to mean that the brain works like a computers.  This is not 
> what is meant, however.
> What is meant is that computers are universal behavior replicators. In the 
> same way a record player is a universal sound producer. You would not say the 
> brain works like a computer any more than you would say Pavarotti's vocal 
> cords work like a record player.  Yet you could say a record player can 
> produce the same sounds as Pavarotti's vocal cords, and similarly you could 
> say a universal behavior replicator (a Turing machine) can replicate the 
> behaviors of a brain (as it can replicate the behaviors of any finite system).
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological laws (to 
> run the spectrum) are all human inventions. 
> 
> The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like emergence, 
> reduction, downward causation are used).
> 
> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from information 
> processing.


OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing is 
like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the “[]p” 
in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is aware that 
she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness, and that she 
cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p & p”, so she is 
bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the knower, which is 
pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I would say that this 
might corresponds to your “experience” processing.

Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the number 
experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for the 
qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can define 
nor test.

All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please 
note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when 
self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the 
same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc. 

Bruno





> 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
> 
> - pt
> 
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