On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
>>>>>>> materialists.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the 
>>>>>>> consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but 
>>>>>>> still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
>>>>>>> physical 
>>>>>>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with 
>>>>>>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global 
>>>>>>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
>>>>>>> material 
>>>>>>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
>>>>>>> have 
>>>>>>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X 
>>>>>>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not 
>>>>>>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they 
>>>>>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", 
>>>>>> and 
>>>>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
>>>>>> community.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" 
>>>>>> by physics.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both 
>>>>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will 
>>>>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" 
>>>>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to 
>>>>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
>>>>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight 
>>>>> the difference:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be 
>>>>> explained or derived from anything else):*
>>>>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>>>>
>>>>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
>>>>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>>>>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>>>>
>>>>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with 
>>>>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>>>>
>>>>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
>>>>> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider 
>>>>> why 
>>>>> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no 
>>>>> evidence 
>>>>> for it.
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
>>>>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
>>>>> consciousness.
>>>>>
>>>>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
>>>>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jason
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) 
>>>> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
>>>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  
>>>>
>>>> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
>>>> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>>>>
>>>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of 
>>>> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not 
>>>> reducible to physical properties.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does 
>>>> not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>>>>
>>>> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
>>>> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter 
>>>> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
>>>> functionally equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include 
>>>> biomechanical (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no 
>>>> restriction of "mechanical".
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, 
>>> regardless of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that 
>>> component is functionally equivalent to the part replaced.  Mechanism is 
>>> the belief held by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, and 
>>> there is no magic in it.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>> The concept of some theoretical chemists (vs. some theoretical 
>> physicists) is that there are laws of chemistry that cannot be reduced to 
>> laws of physics. Not that they 'violate' laws of physics. What physics 
>> governs still works.
>>
>
> Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just as 
> biological interactions are ultimately chemical.
>  
>
>>
>> If 'function' (in "functionally equivalent") includes experiential as 
>> well as just informational functionality, then that something else.
>>
>> The brain is a machine: A biomachine. The human is a biocomputer:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer
>>
>>
> But all computers are equivalent.
>
> Jason
>  
>
>> No problem there.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>>
"Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just as 
biological interactions are ultimately chemical."

That is a statement of faith (the list of "unsolved problems in chemistry" 
above should bring some skepticism), almost like one would see in a 
church's catechism.

See http://www.eoht.info/page/Anti-reductionism on "anti-reductionism" and 
those that are "skeptics" or the reductionist belief.


"But all computers are equivalent."

See 

Call for Abstracts

The First International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Material 
Computing (TEMC 2019)

https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html

Material computing  exploits unconventional physical substrates and/or 
unconventional computational models to perform physical computation in a 
non-silicon and/or *non-Turing paradigm*.

- pt

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to