> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from information 
>> processing.
> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing 
> is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the 
> “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is 
> aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness, 
> and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p & 
> p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the 
> knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I 
> would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing.
> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can 
> define nor test.
> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please 
> note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when 
> self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the 
> same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc. 
> Bruno
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ 
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/>
>> - pt
> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
> perspective, for experiential processing.
> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with 
> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self" 
> such that your self is a real thing


> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing),


> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't say 
> (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is 
> doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.

Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal number, 
it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will is a vague 
term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete information. 

> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on 
> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/> ] …

I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to admit 
that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the provability 
predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct brain/body) only filters 
the consciousness of the universal machine. When unrpogrammed, and without 
input, its consciousness is quite different from the mundane consciousness, it 
is more like a highly dissociated state of consciousness, out of time and 
space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral experiences to develop the 
aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain, that sense is basically 

The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 


> - pt
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