> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from information >> processing. > > > OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing > is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the > “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is > aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness, > and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p & > p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the > knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I > would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing. > > Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the > number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for > the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can > define nor test. > > All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal > machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please > note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when > self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the > same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc. > > Bruno > >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ >> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/> >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/ >> >> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/> >> >> - pt >> > > This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) > perspective, for experiential processing. > > This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with > stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self" > such that your self is a real thing
OK. > (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing), OK. > and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't say > (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is > doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing. Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete information. > > > > "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on > Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 > http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/> ] … I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain, that sense is basically innate. The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a body/code. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
