On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from >> *information >> processing.* >> >> >> >> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information >> processing is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. >> It is the “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) >> machine is aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own >> correctness, and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between >> []p and “[]p & p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the >> soul or of the knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p >> description. I would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” >> processing. >> >> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the >> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for >> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody >> can define nor test. >> >> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal >> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. >> Please note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even >> if, when self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all >> obey to the same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, >> contents, etc. >> >> Bruno >> >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ >> >> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/ >> >> - pt >> >> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) > perspective, for experiential processing. > > This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with > stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of > "self" such that your self is a real thing > > > OK. > > > > (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing), > > > OK. > > > and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't > say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that > is doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing. > > > > Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal > number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and > free-will is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence > of complete information. > > > > > > > "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference > on Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 > http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ ] … > > > I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to > admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the > provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct > brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When > unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from > the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of > consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral > experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain > brain, that sense is basically innate. > > The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a > body/code. > > Bruno > > > > It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)
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