On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:04:20 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > > On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) >>>>>>>>> real materialists. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the >>>>>>>>> consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>> still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The >>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with >>>>>>>>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global >>>>>>>>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the >>>>>>>>> material >>>>>>>>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with >>>>>>>>> X >>>>>>>>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not >>>>>>>>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they >>>>>>>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to >>>>>>>> physics", and >>>>>>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific >>>>>>>> community. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being >>>>>>>> "explainable" by physics.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using >>>>>>>> both terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I >>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’." >>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of >>>>>>>> "physicalism" (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be >>>>>>>> reduced to physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" >>>>>>>> definition. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is >>>>>>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not. These diagrams I made >>>>>>> highlight >>>>>>> the difference: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be >>>>>>> explained or derived from anything else):* >>>>>>> [image: primary-physicalism.png] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be >>>>>>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):* >>>>>>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with >>>>>>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of >>>>>>> Primary Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to >>>>>>> consider why it is you believe in something so strongly despite there >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> no evidence for it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet >>>>>>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in >>>>>>> consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a >>>>>>> loose confirmation of digital mechanism. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) >>>>>> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of >>>>>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?" >>>>>> >>>>>> See *List of unsolved problems in chemistry* >>>>>> - >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry >>>>>> >>>>>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of >>>>>> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties >>>>>> not >>>>>> reducible to physical properties. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) >>>>>> does not cover what is chemical (much less biological). >>>>>> >>>>>> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, >>>>>> biological, psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It >>>>>> doesn't >>>>>> matter whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet >>>>>> functionally equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include >>>>>> biomechanical (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no >>>>>> restriction of "mechanical". >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, >>>>> regardless of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that >>>>> component is functionally equivalent to the part replaced. Mechanism is >>>>> the belief held by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, >>>>> and >>>>> there is no magic in it. >>>>> >>>>> Jason >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> The concept of some theoretical chemists (vs. some theoretical >>>> physicists) is that there are laws of chemistry that cannot be reduced to >>>> laws of physics. Not that they 'violate' laws of physics. What physics >>>> governs still works. >>>> >>> >>> Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just >>> as biological interactions are ultimately chemical. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> If 'function' (in "functionally equivalent") includes experiential as >>>> well as just informational functionality, then that something else. >>>> >>>> The brain is a machine: A biomachine. The human is a biocomputer: >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer >>>> >>>> >>> But all computers are equivalent. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>>> No problem there. >>>> >>>> - pt >>>> >>>> >>>> >> "Chemistry is nothing beyond the interactions of particle physics, just >> as biological interactions are ultimately chemical." >> >> That is a statement of faith (the list of "unsolved problems in >> chemistry" above should bring some skepticism), almost like one would see >> in a church's catechism. >> >> > "Chemical" is a human invention to summarize and simplify natural laws > concerning larger systems of particles. I don't know what it could mean to > say there is a chemical phenomenon which is not a result of natural laws. > > You may say this is a statement of faith, but it is as much a statement of > faith to believe unsolved problems will be explained as the result of > chemicals (which again are just particles) are doing things their > underlying particles would not do on their own as particles. > > >> See http://www.eoht.info/page/Anti-reductionism on "anti-reductionism" >> and those that are "skeptics" or the reductionist belief. >> > > There are of course emergent phenomenon, like clouds and dogs. And I think > it is likely consciousness (as it is with a computation) is something that > cannot be not reduced and explained in terms of its parts. But no one has > demonstrated a biological organism violating a chemical law, nor a chemical > reaction violating a physical law, just as in a large and complex > computation, at no time does this computation permit the CPU to do > something it should not. > > >> >> >> "But all computers are equivalent." >> >> See >> >> Call for Abstracts >> >> The First International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental >> Material Computing (TEMC 2019) >> >> >> https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html >> >> Material computing exploits unconventional physical substrates and/or >> unconventional computational models to perform physical computation in a >> non-silicon and/or *non-Turing paradigm*. >> >> > I think by "Non-Turning" they mean in a manner dissimilar to the > architecture of Turing's machines. In none of those unconventional > computing paradigms is it possible to compute anything that a Turing > machine could not compute. If there were it would be huge news as it would > overturn one of the most widely and deeply believed principals in computer > science. > > When someone says the mind or brain are computational, it is commonly > misunderstood to mean that the brain works like a computers. This is not > what is meant, however. > What is meant is that computers are universal behavior replicators. In the > same way a record player is a universal sound producer. You would not say > the brain works like a computer any more than you would say Pavarotti's > vocal cords work like a record player. Yet you could say a record player > can produce the same sounds as Pavarotti's vocal cords, and similarly you > could say a universal behavior replicator (a Turing machine) can replicate > the behaviors of a brain (as it can replicate the behaviors of any finite > system). > > Jason >
Of course *physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological *laws (to run the spectrum) are all human inventions. The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like *emergence, reduction, downward causation* are used). In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from *information processing.* https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/ - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
