In the experientialist (Strawson-Goff-etc. "panpsychist" view): experiential qualia (EQ) exist in matter at some level on their own -- and EQ cannot be reduced to information (numbers).
So real "selfness" cannot be achieved in any "Gödel-Löb-etc." theorem prover running on the so-called conventional computer. Now some future biological computers -- made via synthetic biology -- open new possibilities. - pt On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 3:28:14 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: > > Yes, no need to apply. They are using the concept of self-reference in a > misleading way. The true meaning of self-reference is an entity that refers > to itself. There are several problems with the way in which they are using > the concept. First problem is that "machine" is not an entity. "Machine" is > just an idea in consciousness, it doesn't have an independent existence, it > doesn't have any ontological status, it doesn't exist as an entity. And > since it doesn't exist, it cannot refer to itself, or for that matter it > cannot do anything. Only consciousness (and its forms of manifestation: > qualia) has ontological status. > > The second issue is that the way self-reference refers to itself is to > incorporate itself in the very act of referring. Basically, the observer, > the observed, and the act of observation are all one and the same thing. > I'm pretty much you cannot think of a machine in these terms. So a > "self-referential machine" is just words-play. It doesn't have anything in > common whatsoever with the true characteristics of the true self-reference. > > On Tuesday, 16 April 2019 09:24:46 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> So, no need to apply? :) >> >> >> *Seeking Research Fellows in Type Theory and Machine Self-Reference* >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
