On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:27:31 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 03:17:59AM -0700, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything > List wrote: > > Self-reference is formalisable. See Löb's theorem. > > >
The problematic part of "self-reference" is "self". HOL theorem proving agents - as developed at MIRI and MIT-CSAIL - (attempt to) implement Löbian provability-logic reflection. (*Self-" is used a lot [ https://intelligence.org/files/TilingAgentsDraft.pdf ].) This may be sufficient for non-conscious, intelligent robots. But if "self" is what (for example) Galen Strawson* defines, the above is not "self-reflection". Because there is no "self". ** at least some ultimates must be experiential* https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/935894.Consciousness_and_Its_Place_in_Nature - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
