On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:27:31 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 03:17:59AM -0700, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything > List wrote: > > Self-reference is formalisable. See Löb's theorem. > > >
The problematic part of "self-reference" is "self". HOL theorem proving agents - as developed at MIRI and MIT-CSAIL - (attempt to) implement Löbian provability-logic reflection. (*Self-" is used a lot [ https://intelligence.org/files/TilingAgentsDraft.pdf ].) This may be sufficient for non-conscious, intelligent robots. But if "self" is what (for example) Galen Strawson* defines, the above is not "self-reflection". Because there is no "self". ** at least some ultimates must be experiential* https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/935894.Consciousness_and_Its_Place_in_Nature - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
