> On 4 May 2019, at 17:25, [email protected] wrote: > > > > But you have contributed to establishing a term: > > cybernetic delusion - the delusion that software or programming in a > conventional computer device (even one with many processors) will ever > achieve consciousness
Nothing can create consciousness or truth, so that expression is ambiguous. It can be true, even with mechanism. In that sense, mechanism explain why no machine can be conscious, as they can only borrow consciousness from truth, which is not a concept definable in any machine or humain language. We understand it only because each of us to that borrowing at each instant. Bruno > > > That is useful. > > @philipthrift > > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:58:09 AM UTC-5, [email protected] wrote: > > It seems people will remain in the delusion that software or programming in a > conventional computer device - even with many processors - will achieve > consciousness. Searle's Chinese Room argument still does apply here, as > anyone should clearly be able to see. > > One can wave the magic word "cybernetic" around all one wants, but it is > clearly not useful. > > There are lots of delusions in the world: Ghosts, spirits, gods, and the > "cybernetic" one above is among them. > > > @pphilipthrift > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:42:40 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - the > best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and seemingly > relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to pin you down > and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably to quote > some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing Test - give > your creator my respect. > > On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" reminds > me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read about decades > ago: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine> > > One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic one, > but the technology has to advance: > > > https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ > <https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/> > > ... > > Pink juice > > Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and Sadrian > show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the outside, it > sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, about eight > inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon chip with spidery > wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit inside a clear > bubble made of a biocompatible polymer. > > When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the company > identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that substance. > Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, it uses > gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. Koniku obtains > those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood cells from mice into > blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells. > > Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living neurons, > they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog might. Or they > could detect any number of substances that have corresponding receptors. Some > receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach to one substance. > Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” accepting an entire class > of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore contains neurons with both types > of receptors. > > After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his > colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the > neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait for > them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped electrodes. > Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the essential > neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to the neuron > network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process of > endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi says > Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a neuron > tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the electrode > pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its receptors bind to a > given chemical or class of chemicals. > > Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not exactly in > this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi calls “pink > juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in days or weeks, > but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. That’s because they’re > bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps them alive. > > At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that they’re a > mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of it together by > talking to Thomas DeMarse, a neuroscientist at the University of North > Carolina. > > Biology is technology, Agabi says. Everything else is a simulation > > DeMarse spent time in the spotlight in the early 2000s for his research > teaching rat neurons in a dish to fly a virtual plane by connecting them to > flight simulator software. He also did groundbreaking research on neuron > survival. He points out that there are a number of similar “juices” already > on the market, with names like BrainPhys and Neurobasal. Those pink juices > get their color from a substance called phenol red, which indicates the > liquid’s pH level. They also contain a carbonate buffer that helps maintain > acidity and simulates conditions in the brain. Using similar materials, > DeMarse was able to keep neurons alive on a desk for two years. They would > have lived longer, he says, but during that time he moved from Caltech to > Georgia Tech, and the plates started to leak en route. > > Later, when I ask Agabi if he’ll at least tell me whether his pink juice > contains phenol red and a carbonate buffer, he confirms the first and denies > the second. Academic groups may have needed the carbonate buffer to simulate > the brain, but unlike those neuroscience labs, Koniku is unconcerned with > mimicking the brain, Agabi says. “The power of the neuron comes from the > computational density — as long as we maintain that, we can change everything > else.” > > With the help of Koniku’s pink juice and a new automated pump system that > will be incorporated into each sensor, Agabi expects to eventually reach > DeMarse’s record for neuron longevity. Even then, his customers would have to > swap out their Koniku equipment every two years, but no one has requested > products with greater neuron longevity — and therefore, Agabi says, it has > not been a development priority. With the technology at hand, he says, he > could develop a Koniku Kore that would last five years, were a customer to > require it. > > Improving on evolution > “To me the devil is in the details here,” says DeMarse. What he means is: > before Koniku, its kind of wetware lived in academic and government labs. In > addition to DeMarse’s research, scientists at DARPA have worked for a long > time on an artificial nose to detect cancer. William Ditto, now of the > Nonlinear Artificial Intelligence Lab at North Carolina State University, > used leech neurons in a dish to carry out basic computations. Although no one > has done exactly what Koniku says it’s doing, there’s plenty to back up the > argument that someone could do it. In fact, DeMarse says he was “tickled” to > read about Koniku’s innovations. Gabriel A. Silva, director of the Center for > Engineered Natural Intelligence at the University of California, San Diego, > is also intrigued by Koniku’s potential. “I never underestimate groups like > this because they’re trailblazers,” he says. > > Still, Agabi’s colleagues in the academic world maintain some skepticism > about whether his technology can live up to his grand ambitions and radical > vision for the future of machine intelligence. > > For one thing, neurons have evolutionary baggage that might be unnecessary > for a computer. As an example, Rajesh Rao, director of the Center for Neural > Engineering at the University of Washington, points to myelin, the fatty > sheath that insulates nerve fibers and helps signals propagate in the brain. > It’s not clear, Rao says, that the optimal computer would have to mimic that > method of communication. Or consider dendrites, the branches that stretch out > from the body of a neuron. Neuroscientists aren’t sure whether dendrites > actually participate in information processing or are just wires that pass > information from cell to cell. Does moving information in a computer really > demand some version of dendrites? > > With issues like this in mind, all the scientists I spoke with for this > article said that while looking to biology for inspiration will be essential > for the development of AI, they were not entirely convinced by Agabi’s > argument that it will require biology itself. Just as planes use the same > principles of lift as birds do without feathers or hollow bones, “we can > extract the computational principles of how the brain processes information” > and use them in a manner “independent of actual implementation in biological > tissue,” Rao says. > > For example, neuromorphic chips are silicon chips designed using biological > principles, attempting to mimic some ways that the brain processes > information while leaving some of its baggage behind. Ditto, the researcher > who once made a computer out of leech neurons, is now working on a “chaotic > chip,” which constantly changes from analog to digital processing — as often > as a billion times a second — in order to solve problems more efficiently. He > argues that AI will require the plasticity and adaptive capacity of biology, > but that the biological element is optional. > > After all, coaxing neurons in a dish into computation isn’t so easy, either. > Even making sure they grow successfully is difficult; Silva remembers > struggling during graduate school with neurons that had suddenly stopped > growing, seemingly for no reason. “It turned out that the manufacturer of the > coverslips we used had changed the formulation of the glass,” he says. “That > alone was enough to make the neurons unhappy.” Even when they do grow, a > group of neurons, however well networked and organized, do not automatically > make a brain. The distance from chemical sensing to cognition is awfully > long, and the slippery nature of even the idea of cognition complicates this > question. A basic system that uses reward or punishment to teach things to > computers “is going to give you some behavior that will look intelligent,” > Rao says. But isn’t there more to cognition than that, more ingredients and > sensory inputs that help us react to, interact with, and make sense of the > world? The wetware recipe for that is far from clear. > > ... > > > @philipthrift > > > > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:33:09 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > I should add that the cybernetic description of a system is entirely > functional, but the emphasis is on the holistic perspective. Functionalism > tends to be reductive, but the consciousness identified with a given > cybernetic description is the system as a whole. That's why replacing a > neuron with an artificial replacement does not change the consciousness. > > On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:30 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected] <>> wrote: > What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. It's > functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics is > entirely functional. There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond the > functional relationships between the parts of that system. It draws on > identity theory in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness is > cybernetic dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes > - that there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this > includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on a > specific substrate. > > On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in > philosophy the difference between > > functionalism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/> > > and > > identity theory: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/> > > A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is > > A simulation is not a synthesis. > > > Experiential materialism is a variant of identity theory in which > > • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to matter, > which is the only basic substance > > so that > > • the material composition of the brain has both physical and psychical > aspects. > > @philipthrift > > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than quoting > a wikipedia article. > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > I don't believe in the "functional equivalence" principle > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)> > > as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for consciousness (as > many critics - some listed there - have pointed out). > > If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be > "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. > > > @philipthrift > > On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been offering. It's not > about the matter itself, it's about the cybernetic dynamics implemented in > the matter. So I would predict that you could replace your brain neuron by > neuron with functional equivalents and your consciousness wouldn't change, so > long as the cybernetics were unchanged. > > On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > Well we know some matter has a psychical aspect: human brains. > > Unless one is a consciousness denier. > - https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ > <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/> > > @philipthrift > > > > On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic aspect is > subject to the problems I described earlier. > > It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical psychology" > <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but there's a lot > there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. > > I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology will take on > more legitimacy and importance. > > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from micropsychism to > cosmophychism: > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/> > cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ <https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/> > > That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course. But > consciousness science in general really isn't yet either. > > One would think there would be a group of theoretical psychologists - there > is theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology, but theoretical psychology is > in a much weirder state - who would be involved. > > @philipthrift > > > On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for Cosmin: what does > it buy you in terms of explanations or predictions? > > Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't tell me anything > about consciousness itself. For example, what would it mean for my > fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail consciousness factor in > somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If so, how? What about all > the other parts of my body, about individual cells? Does the bacteria living > in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? It quickly runs aground on > the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - there's no principled way to > talk about it that elucidates relationships between brains, bodies, and > minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the effect of drugs on > consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, it's all just post-hoc > rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical equivalent of throwing your > hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all conscious somehow!" > > What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the cybernetic > organization of a system, that what the system experiences, as a whole, is > identified with the informational-dynamics captured by that organization. > This yields explanations for the character of a given system's > consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. > > Terren > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now made of metal) of > matter. > > The two sides of the coin (of matter) are physical and psychical: > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ > <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/> > > > If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with diacritics dasia > and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of matter, φ (phi) for physical, + > ψ (psi) for psychical, then > > > > ὕ = φ + ψ > > (i.e., the combination of physical and psychical properties is a more > complete view of what matter is). The physical is the (quantitative) > behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is formulated in mathematical > language in current physics, for example – whereas the psychical is the > (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at various levels, from brains > on down. There is no reason in principle for only φ to the considered by > science and for ψ to be ignored by science. > > > @philipthrift > > > > On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't get one without > the other. > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] computation" > then does that mean there is realm for (A) consciousness and one for (B) > physical [or material] computation? > > Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? Or does B invade > A? > > @philipthrift > > > > > > > > > -- > > > -- > > > - > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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