> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, [email protected] wrote: > > > I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this: > > The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.
You know that? > > > > Is the church-Turing thesis true? > Carol E. Cleland > https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC <https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC> > > The Church-Turing thesis makes a bold claim about the theoretical limits to > computation. It is based upon independent analyses of the general notion of > an effective procedure proposed by Alan Turing and Alonzo Church in the > 1930''s. As originally construed, the thesis applied only to the number > theoretic functions; it amounted to the claim that there were no number > theoretic functions which couldn't be computed by a Turing machine but could > be computed by means of some other kind of effective procedure. Since that > time, however, other interpretations of the thesis have appeared in the > literature. In this paper I identify three domains of application which have > been claimed for the thesis: (1) the number theoretic functions; (2) all > functions; (3) mental and/or physical phenomena. Subsequently, I provide an > analysis of our intuitive concept of a procedure which, unlike Turing''s, is > based upon ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes, directions and > methods; I call them mundane procedures. I argue that mundane procedures can > be said to be effective in the same sense in which Turing machine procedures > can be said to be effective. I also argue that mundane procedures differ from > Turing machine procedures in a fundamental way, viz., the former, but not the > latter, generate causal processes. I apply my analysis to all three of the > above mentioned interpretations of the Church-Turing thesis, arguing that the > thesis is (i) clearly false under interpretation (3), (ii) false in at least > some possible worlds (perhaps even in the actual world) under interpretation > (2), and (iii) very much open to question under interpretation (1) > > cf http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf > <http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf> > That type of refutation is proposed by the universal machine too, but with mechanism, this does not violate the Church Turing thesis. So, to argue against the classical usual Church’s thesis, by proposing an formal procedure is bound to fail, or to admit interpretation involving the first person of the machine, which in this case does not violate CT. The paper fail to give a computable function not Turing emulable. Tha auhor is not aware that CT is formulated here in the extensional version, in term of set of computable function from N to N. But the extensional CT entails an intensional version, which asserts that not only all universal numbers compute the same class of functions, but that they can imitate the manner in which the computations are done. For example, you can write a Fortan program emulating a pattern of the game of life, itself emulating a von Neumann extended boolean graph, itself emulating the the 10^1000 x 10^1000 Heseinberg-Dirac-Feynman matrix emulating our galactic quantum field emulating each of us right. People confuse computation, and the ten thousand higher level notion, to begin with provability, which has deep relation with computability but are importantly quite different notions (computability is universal, absolute, but provability is relative and has no universal predicate, making G, G* extraordinary as they axiomatic the propositional level of what is true and what machine can prove about their provability for a very large class of entities (the Löbian entities). Church was anticipated by Emil Post in the 1920s, and by Babbage I as I argue in my long text, as Babbage is said to have been more sorry for the non understanding of its functional language than for the non understanding of its universal machine, which makes me think that he got the point he saw their deep mathematical equivalence. There are empirical evidences for CT: the fact that anyone trying to violate it did not succeed, the fact that very different definition of “intuitively computable” have all lead to the same class of functions, the fact that some of those definition occurred with different motivation (like Shoenfinkel’s discovery of the combinators), but led again to the same class. The fact that a quantum computer cannot violate CT, etc. And there is one hyper-strong theoretical evidence for CT, which is that the set of of those functions computed by digital number, executed by universal number, is close for Cantor’s transendental diagonal procedure. At fist sight that seems impossible, especially after Gödel proved his incompleteness theorem, showing that provability cannot be "universal “ (complete) using that diagonal technic. Where is the error in the following reasoning? If there is a universal language in which I can describe, by programs, all computable functions from N to N, then I can enumerate all the programs, by ordering them by length, and alphabetically those have the same length: p_0, p_1, p_2, …. I note F_0, F_1, F_2, … the corresponding enumeration of the computable functions from N to N. But then, I can define the function G by G(n) = F_n(n) + 1. (That is, F_n applied to n, + 1). I can generate the list of the F_n, so to compute G(n), I search F_n, and compute F_n with the program p_n, and then I add 1, which is computable. So G is computable, and is a computable function from N to N. So, if my pretension to universality is right, there is some program computing G. There is some program p_k computing G, so G = F_k. (By the definition above F_i is the function computed by the program p_i). k is the precise number order of p_k). Applying perversely G on its own number k, we have that 1) G(k) = F_k(k), given that G = F_k. But by definition of G, we have that 2) G(k) = F_k(k) + 1 By Leibniz principle, two quantity equal to a third are equal, we have that F_k(k) = F_k(k) + 1 By F_k being a computable function from N to N, F_k(k) is a number, so I can subtract it from both sides, leading to: 0 = 1. Contradiction. That is how Kleene thought he refuted Church’s thesis, when Church claimed that he can compute all computable function with his lambda calculus. But Kleene will think twice, and he discovered his mistake, and became “overnight” an ardent supporter of Church’s thesis. He is the one who will mention that thesis as a thesis. Church is unclear on this. Emil Post describe it as a law in cognitive science, that he sees as natural, in the beginning of its anticipation, and differently in other passages. Post will found Recursion Theory later with its 1944 paper. The interesting thing is that you can find diverse mistakes, and correct the argument in many ways, and each leads to an important theorem in Recursion theory. I let you think. We do have a problem, Philip Thrift, if you have such disdain for the Church-Turing thesis. As I said, by “Mechanism" I mean YD + CT. (YD = Yes doctor = a sump up for the invariance of consciousness for a functional digital substitution made at some level), and CT, Church’s Thesis, or Church-Turing, to define mathematically what means computable, what is a computation, what machine can prove about this, and what they can know, observe, etc.). It is of course CT which makes the arithmetical reality emulating all computations. CT is not trivial. One of the correction of the argument above gives a direct proof of a very general sort of essential undecidability and incompleteness for all effective theories (theories which proofs are mechanically checkable). CT is what make the universal number, truly universal in the realm of computability. It is the first time, perhaps the last, that an epistemic notion admits a precise mathematical definition. A slightly weaker version of CT is that there is a universal machine. I do find crazy that many people accepts this so quickly. It took me some time to find it plausible. Gödel also took some time, but when he saw the error above, he admits that there is something very deep, and tap about a miracle … But I will say more later, or I give the solution to the exercise. CT is of big use, as it makes Digital Mechanism, and the Machine’s theology, into precise mathematical theories. But CT shows that universality cost a big price. Which you should find if you try to solve the problem above. Bruno > etc. > > @philipthrift > > On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 5:49:22 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: > How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect it). > > Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly visible > behaviors). > > Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed computer > can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a person with an > appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's skill, and wired into > the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic the behaviors, speech > patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have ever met. > > Do you dispute any of the above? If you encountered a close friend who had > to get a computer replacement for his brain (e.g. due to an inoperable > tumor), and this friend displayed perfect mimicry of the behavior prior to > the surgery, would you continue to tell him he his not conscious, despite his > protestations that he is every bit as conscious as before? On what basis > would this your claim rest? > > Jason > > On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:33 PM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > Re: "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter is > conscious" > > I do think the first (human brains at least, and perhaps some non-human > brains, from primates to down* the "food-chain"). > > Some think there was no fully or cognitively conscious (only a sensory > conscious) human before language. There may be something to that. > > But not the second (where there is self and self-awareness). Rocks are not > conscious. But the idea is that all matter does have some level of elementary > protoconsciousness in various types, phases, and configurations of matter. > When some matter is combined into certain configurations (like a human > brain), these protopsychical parts are fused into something conscious. > > * Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego? > The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains, which could > show a rudimentary form of consciousness > > https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/ > > <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/> > > > I don't think that societies are conscious, the Earth is conscious, the > universe is conscious. > > The Earth is aware of itself? I don't think so. > > @philipthrift > > > > On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 8:25:26 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a problem. > But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is identified with > cybernetic dynamics. I'm exploring the consequences of that idea, which are > compelling IMO. > > You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that assumption. But > it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a more correct way to > view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about what that is, > vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all > matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you fall prey to the > cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, you fail to explain what > privileges certain kinds of matter over others. It seems pretty clear to me > that there's no principled way to do that... any explanation of why brains > can be conscious but not computers starts to sound suspiciously like "spirit" > and "soul", in the sense that you're invoking some property of matter that > cannot be detected. > > Terren > > On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 4:57 AM <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:30:00 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:15 PM 'Cosmin Visan' <[email protected] > <>> wrote: > > > > What happens in cases of telepathy is [...]. For example, in cases of dream > > telepathy [...] This clearly is a case of dream telepathy. > > OK, there was little doubt before but you just made it official, Cosmin Visan > is a crackpot. > > John K Clark > > > > > > Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a really > crackpot idea. > > @philipthrift > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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