On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect >>> it). >>> >>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly >>> visible behaviors). >>> >>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's >>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic >>> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have >>> ever met. >>> >>> Do you dispute any of the above? >>> >>> >>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary >>> program. >>> >> >> >> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes of >> the thought experiment). >> >> >> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. >> > > > The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we > know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could > convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness? > > > I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as > intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be > interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not > finitely describable. > Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point? I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer. Jason > > Brent > > > Jason > > >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> >> Jason >> >> >>> >>> >>> If you encountered a close friend who had to get a computer replacement >>> for his brain (e.g. due to an inoperable tumor), and this friend displayed >>> perfect mimicry of the behavior prior to the surgery, would you continue to >>> tell him he his not conscious, despite his protestations that he is every >>> bit as conscious as before? On what basis would this your claim rest? >>> >>> >>> Some of my friends I'd tell him it was amazing how much smarter he was. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:33 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Re: "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter is >>>> conscious" >>>> >>>> I do think the first (human brains at least, and perhaps some non-human >>>> brains, from primates to down* the "food-chain"). >>>> >>>> Some think there was no fully or cognitively conscious (only a sensory >>>> conscious) human before language. There may be something to that. >>>> >>>> But not the second (where there is self and self-awareness). *Rocks >>>> are not conscious.* But the idea is that all matter does have some >>>> level of *elementary protoconsciousness* in various types, phases, >>>> and configurations of matter. When some matter is combined into certain >>>> configurations (like a human brain), these *protopsychical parts* are >>>> fused into something conscious. >>>> >>>> * Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego? >>>> *The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains, >>>> which could show a rudimentary form of consciousness* >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/ >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't think that societies are conscious, the Earth is conscious, the >>>> universe is conscious. >>>> >>>> The Earth is aware of itself? I don't think so. >>>> >>>> @philipthrift >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 8:25:26 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>> >>>>> You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a >>>>> problem. But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is >>>>> identified with cybernetic dynamics. I'm exploring the consequences of >>>>> that >>>>> idea, which are compelling IMO. >>>>> >>>>> You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that >>>>> assumption. But it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a >>>>> more correct way to view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about >>>>> what that is, vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be >>>>> conscious" and "all matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you >>>>> fall prey to the cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, *you >>>>> fail to explain what privileges certain kinds of matter over others*. >>>>> It seems pretty clear to me that there's no principled way to do that... >>>>> any explanation of why brains can be conscious but not computers starts to >>>>> sound suspiciously like "spirit" and "soul", in the sense that you're >>>>> invoking some property of matter that cannot be detected. >>>>> >>>>> Terren >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 4:57 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:30:00 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:15 PM 'Cosmin Visan' < >>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *> What happens in cases of telepathy is [...]. For example, in >>>>>>>> cases of dream telepathy [...] This clearly is a case of dream >>>>>>>> telepathy.* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> OK, there was little doubt before but you just made it official, Cosmin >>>>>>> Visan is a crackpot. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> John K Clark >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a >>>>>> really crackpot idea. >>>>>> >>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> > > > > > > > >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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