> On 6 May 2019, at 03:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > That's part of my argument with Bruno concerning the environment. He agrees > that the simulation of one's brain would have to include at least a local > part of the environment, but he sees this as mere small expansion in the > scope of the simulation which must also be computable.
But that follows from YD+CT. I use the notion of generalised brain to avoid you objection. The brain is whatever you feel we need to emulate, at some level, so that a digital emulation, done physically (at first) makes you fell no difference. If you tell me, or your doctor, that we need to emulate the entire cluster of galaxies around the Milky Way, no problem (if you can afford the artifcial brain). All what I prove depends on the (necessary non constructive) existence of some level of substitution. If the environment plays some part in your brain processing, so that the usual sensor entry in the body are not enough, and perhaps the gravitational wave have to be taken into account, there is no problem, as long as a digital truncation exists. With mechanism, for a period of time, you get only finite amounts of information through the sensors, so you cannot use the need of an environment to refute the UDA. Or you introduce some magic in the environment, but then you argue against mechanism. > Cleland seems to take the other extreme that a conscious program is > necessarily interactive and what it interacts with is uncomputable (although > what we know is that it's not practical to compute it). The language ADA would be useful to emulate such interactions, but Cleland does not provide one clue why this is not Turing emulable. I am not sure the paper give any argument. There is there only a presentation of a certain type of computation, and the paper has actually nothing to do with CT. Bruno > > Brent > > On 5/5/2019 4:40 PM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this: >> >> The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented. >> >> >> >> Is the church-Turing thesis true? >> Carol E. Cleland >> https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC <https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC> >> >> The Church-Turing thesis makes a bold claim about the theoretical limits to >> computation. It is based upon independent analyses of the >> general notion of an effective procedure proposed by Alan Turing and Alonzo >> Church in the 1930''s. As originally construed, the thesis applied only to >> the number theoretic functions; it amounted to the claim that there were no >> number theoretic functions which couldn't be computed by a Turing machine >> but could be computed by means of some other kind of effective procedure. >> Since that time, however, other interpretations of the thesis have appeared >> in the literature. In this paper I identify three domains of application >> which have been claimed for the thesis: (1) the number theoretic functions; >> (2) all functions; (3) mental and/or physical phenomena. Subsequently, I >> provide an analysis of our intuitive concept of a procedure which, unlike >> Turing''s, is based upon ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes, >> directions and methods; I call them mundane procedures. I argue that mundane >> procedures can be said to be effective in the same sense in which Turing >> machine procedures can be said to be effective. I also argue that mundane >> procedures differ from Turing machine procedures in a fundamental way, viz., >> the former, but not the latter, generate causal processes. I apply my >> analysis to all three of the above mentioned interpretations of the >> Church-Turing thesis, arguing that the thesis is (i) clearly false under >> interpretation (3), (ii) false in at least some possible worlds (perhaps >> even in the actual world) under interpretation (2), and (iii) very much open >> to question under interpretation (1) >> >> cf http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf >> <http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf> >> >> etc. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 5:49:22 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: >> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect it). >> >> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly visible >> behaviors). >> >> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's skill, >> and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic the >> behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have ever >> met. >> >> Do you dispute any of the above? If you encountered a close friend who had >> to get a computer replacement for his brain (e.g. due to an inoperable >> tumor), and this friend displayed perfect mimicry of the behavior prior to >> the surgery, would you continue to tell him he his not conscious, despite >> his protestations that he is every bit as conscious as before? On what >> basis would this your claim rest? >> >> Jason >> >> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:33 PM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> Re: "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter is >> conscious" >> >> I do think the first (human brains at least, and perhaps some non-human >> brains, from primates to down* the "food-chain"). >> >> Some think there was no fully or cognitively conscious (only a sensory >> conscious) human before language. There may be something to that. >> >> But not the second (where there is self and self-awareness). Rocks are not >> conscious. But the idea is that all matter does have some level of >> elementary protoconsciousness in various types, phases, and configurations >> of matter. When some matter is combined into certain configurations (like a >> human brain), these protopsychical parts are fused into something conscious. >> >> * Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego? >> The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains, which >> could show a rudimentary form of consciousness >> >> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/ >> >> <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/> >> >> >> I don't think that societies are conscious, the Earth is conscious, the >> universe is conscious. >> >> The Earth is aware of itself? I don't think so. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> >> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 8:25:26 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >> You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a problem. >> But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is identified with >> cybernetic dynamics. I'm exploring the consequences of that idea, which are >> compelling IMO. >> >> You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that assumption. But >> it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a more correct way to >> view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about what that is, >> vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all >> matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you fall prey to the >> cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, you fail to explain what >> privileges certain kinds of matter over others. It seems pretty clear to me >> that there's no principled way to do that... any explanation of why brains >> can be conscious but not computers starts to sound suspiciously like >> "spirit" and "soul", in the sense that you're invoking some property of >> matter that cannot be detected. >> >> Terren >> >> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 4:57 AM <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:30:00 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: >> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:15 PM 'Cosmin Visan' <[email protected] >> <>> wrote: >> >> >> > What happens in cases of telepathy is [...]. For example, in cases of >> > dream telepathy [...] This clearly is a case of dream telepathy. >> >> OK, there was little doubt before but you just made it official, Cosmin >> Visan is a crackpot. >> >> John K Clark >> >> >> >> >> >> Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a really >> crackpot idea. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D21621AB-11B3-4DCE-8E30-60520F5DBE95%40ulb.ac.be. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
