> On 12 May 2019, at 00:38, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/8/2019 11:28 PM, smitra wrote: >> On 08-05-2019 21:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: >>> On 5/5/2019 7:06 PM, smitra wrote: >>>> Or perhaps it's a mistake to attribute consciousness to particular >>>> physical systems. Instead of saying that this computer or that brain is or >>>> isn't conscious, we could postulate that there exists (in some sense) >>>> consciousness, and that consciousness can find itself in some location, >>>> and where it finds itself in, is implicitly defined by the content of the >>>> consciousness itself. >>>> >>>> If we then consider the set of all conscious states, then each element of >>>> that set contains a subjective description of some conscious thought which >>>> also contains in it where and when this thought is supposed to have >>>> happened and who it belongs to. But that description of itself won't >>>> contain enough information to fully specify what precise algorithm >>>> generated it. My conscious thoughts won't contain all the information >>>> necessary to reconstruct my brain in the exact state it is now. This means >>>> that there are a large number of different physical systems that are each >>>> consistent with being me in the subjective state I'm in right now. >>>> >>>> But I can still pin myself down to being in an environment that from a >>>> macroscopic point of view must look the same as what I'm seeing right now. >>>> There is then a large number of different physical local environments >>>> within which brains are located that can be said to represent me. I'm all >>>> of them, not one particular item. There is a one-to-one relationship >>>> between me getting more localized inside this set and me changing due to >>>> adding more information to my conscious state. >>>> >>>> Systems that are a lot less complex than our brain obviously run much >>>> simpler algorithms than our brains are running. These algorithms with at >>>> best less awareness, would then not be able to localize themselves as >>>> precisely as we can. But since the state space of the computer is much >>>> smaller >>> >>> State space of the computation or of the computer, the "mind" or the >>> "brain". >>> >>>> , a question like: "is this AI conscious?" implies a far more precise >>>> localization of the AI's consciousness than in case of us. >>> >>> Hmm. I was with you up till that. Your earlier said that the AI >>> being simpler would imply it was LESS localized in physical space, >>> which I agreed with. Now you seem to say the opposite? >>> >> >> Yes, it's indeed going to be less localized but that would mean that it >> won't fit into the device we've set up. So, when we point to our device and >> imagine the conscious AI to be in there, it's not actually in that >> particular device we're looking at. >> >> This coarse grained view goes a long way to address the problems implied by >> thought experiments where one replaces the transistors of the computer or >> the neurons of the brain by a devices that perform the exact same action as >> is actually happening in the instant the AI is supposed to feel something >> but would fail to perform the correct action in a counterfactual situation. >> You could then replace the brain by a recording of brain processes and that >> recording would then be conscious. >> >> The problem is then with attempting to localize conscious in such a fine >> grained picture that's too small to accommodate the algorithm that is >> actually running. In a more course grained picture there do exist >> counterfactuals on nearby branches that the consciousness itself cannot >> resolve. So, in the MWI we should picture ourselves as being located on >> bundles of branches, not on single branches. > > Right. That's Julian Barbour's metaphor of streams in a channel. That means > that "we" exist at the coarse grained level, like other quasi-classical > stuff. That was pretty much Bohr's point. The classical world is > necessarily where we exist and do science
This is coherent with Everett too. Your formulation is more neutral than Bohr, which requires an explicit dualism and some precise cut-off between the quantum realm and the classical realm, that nobody has found. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Saibal >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ed54c56-15ae-e0a3-6fb3-830a14b1ed24%40verizon.net. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/921457CC-4A93-4EDC-840E-7AD09E8F5DCF%40ulb.ac.be.
