> On 12 May 2019, at 00:38, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 5/8/2019 11:28 PM, smitra wrote: >> On 08-05-2019 21:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: >>> On 5/5/2019 7:06 PM, smitra wrote: >>>> Or perhaps it's a mistake to attribute consciousness to particular >>>> physical systems. Instead of saying that this computer or that brain is or >>>> isn't conscious, we could postulate that there exists (in some sense) >>>> consciousness, and that consciousness can find itself in some location, >>>> and where it finds itself in, is implicitly defined by the content of the >>>> consciousness itself. >>>> >>>> If we then consider the set of all conscious states, then each element of >>>> that set contains a subjective description of some conscious thought which >>>> also contains in it where and when this thought is supposed to have >>>> happened and who it belongs to. But that description of itself won't >>>> contain enough information to fully specify what precise algorithm >>>> generated it. My conscious thoughts won't contain all the information >>>> necessary to reconstruct my brain in the exact state it is now. This means >>>> that there are a large number of different physical systems that are each >>>> consistent with being me in the subjective state I'm in right now. >>>> >>>> But I can still pin myself down to being in an environment that from a >>>> macroscopic point of view must look the same as what I'm seeing right now. >>>> There is then a large number of different physical local environments >>>> within which brains are located that can be said to represent me. I'm all >>>> of them, not one particular item. There is a one-to-one relationship >>>> between me getting more localized inside this set and me changing due to >>>> adding more information to my conscious state. >>>> >>>> Systems that are a lot less complex than our brain obviously run much >>>> simpler algorithms than our brains are running. These algorithms with at >>>> best less awareness, would then not be able to localize themselves as >>>> precisely as we can. But since the state space of the computer is much >>>> smaller >>> >>> State space of the computation or of the computer, the "mind" or the >>> "brain". >>> >>>> , a question like: "is this AI conscious?" implies a far more precise >>>> localization of the AI's consciousness than in case of us. >>> >>> Hmm. I was with you up till that. Your earlier said that the AI >>> being simpler would imply it was LESS localized in physical space, >>> which I agreed with. Now you seem to say the opposite? >>> >> >> Yes, it's indeed going to be less localized but that would mean that it >> won't fit into the device we've set up. So, when we point to our device and >> imagine the conscious AI to be in there, it's not actually in that >> particular device we're looking at. >> >> This coarse grained view goes a long way to address the problems implied by >> thought experiments where one replaces the transistors of the computer or >> the neurons of the brain by a devices that perform the exact same action as >> is actually happening in the instant the AI is supposed to feel something >> but would fail to perform the correct action in a counterfactual situation. >> You could then replace the brain by a recording of brain processes and that >> recording would then be conscious. >> >> The problem is then with attempting to localize conscious in such a fine >> grained picture that's too small to accommodate the algorithm that is >> actually running. In a more course grained picture there do exist >> counterfactuals on nearby branches that the consciousness itself cannot >> resolve. So, in the MWI we should picture ourselves as being located on >> bundles of branches, not on single branches. > > Right. That's Julian Barbour's metaphor of streams in a channel. That means > that "we" exist at the coarse grained level, like other quasi-classical > stuff. That was pretty much Bohr's point. The classical world is > necessarily where we exist and do science
This is coherent with Everett too. Your formulation is more neutral than Bohr, which requires an explicit dualism and some precise cut-off between the quantum realm and the classical realm, that nobody has found. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Saibal >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ed54c56-15ae-e0a3-6fb3-830a14b1ed24%40verizon.net. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/921457CC-4A93-4EDC-840E-7AD09E8F5DCF%40ulb.ac.be.
