> On 10 May 2019, at 02:46, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > > Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? > > Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is truly the > same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. > > If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were run > on different hardware. > > From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon some other > element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a more > appropriate substrate. > > But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto, > comprise the whole universe. > > I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole > universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not > affected by what other parts of the universe are doing? > > The computer on my desk is not conscious!
That would indeed be a problem, but how do you know that your laptop (more exactly the universal number that it run) is not conscious? I think it is conscious, but plausibly in a highly dissociative sort of consciousness, with no memory, no time, no space. It might look like after taking a hit dose of a dissociative drug. > > So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in which > it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from which > the consciousnesses and universes are different. > > Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in > computer within a very different universe? Clearly then the outside and > inside view would be very different. > > But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct over > all computations running through your conscious self. So any external > universe is part of that construct through your consciousness. So appealing > to an external universe running a simulation does not help at all. Arithmetic is enough, and it is an open problem if the phenomenology of an external reality can make all accessible dreams coherent enough to singularise a physical universe. Quantum Mechanics put this doubt already in the physics obtained from inductive inference. Open problem. I doubt that the physical reality is well determined. Pure analysis can be shown to be already not unique in thats sense, like second order logic, where all the finite parts of a theory can be consistent, yet the whole theory is not. (Theory = set of its theorems, here). > > Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that pass through > that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be it in silicon > or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a single computation. > > That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through that state > are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify itself with any one > particular thread of computation. In this sense that consciousness is not the > same as one of the programs passing through that state. But to say the > consciousness is not identical with one of the computations is different from > saying that computation is not conscious. > > The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption. If the future of any > conscious moment depends on the statistics over the infinite number of > computations running through that state, then a single computation gives a > conscious moment that does not have a coherent future. Neither does a single > computation exist in a coherent world, since physics, and the appearance of > matter, is also the result of the statistics over the infinite number of > computations. And consciousness must be embedded in a coherent "world" in > order to exist. This makes one suspect that YD + CT, leading to > computationalism, is not a coherent theory. I will look how Jason answers this … Bruno > > Bruce > > If none of the threads of computation resulted in consciousness, you wouldn't > magically get consciousness once you reached an infinite number of them. The > only thing you gain with the infinite number of all the computations going > through that state is the correct statistics regarding the future evolution > of that conscious. > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS_-VmF33kf_r%2Bk1ASsneqk6YgA3f2nzYhxB9WKf9VTTQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS_-VmF33kf_r%2Bk1ASsneqk6YgA3f2nzYhxB9WKf9VTTQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7D1B5837-311A-43CB-B35D-877723D427AB%40ulb.ac.be.
