> On 16 May 2019, at 03:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 5/15/2019 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 13 May 2019, at 21:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/13/2019 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 10 May 2019, at 17:36, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com >>>>> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 1:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/9/2019 7:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? >>>>>> >>>>>> Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is truly >>>>>> the same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. >>>>>> >>>>>> If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they >>>>>> were run on different hardware. >>>>>> >>>>>> From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon some >>>>>> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for >>>>>> a more appropriate substrate. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto, >>>>>> comprise the whole universe. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole >>>>>> universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not >>>>>> affected by what other parts of the universe are doing? >>>>>> >>>>>> The computer on my desk is not conscious! >>>>>> >>>>>> Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any case >>>>>> it can illustrate the point that a computation need not be identical >>>>>> with the whole of the universe that contains it. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in >>>>>> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" >>>>>> from which the consciousnesses and universes are different. >>>>>> >>>>>> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in >>>>>> computer within a very different universe? Clearly then the outside and >>>>>> inside view would be very different. >>>>>> >>>>>> But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct >>>>>> over all computations running through your conscious self. >>>>>> >>>>>> You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and >>>>>> continue to jump back and forth between different levels/definitions of >>>>>> universe. To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that >>>>>> we can be clear which one we are speaking of: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical >>>>>> component which implements its functions digitally (here we change >>>>>> nothing about our assumption of what the physical universe is) >>>>> >>>>> But what are its functions? Do they include quantum level entanglements? >>>>> Dissipation of heat in erasure of information? Does it have the ability >>>>> to perceive and act in the world? >>>>> >>>>> I don't know. This is a matter you would need to discuss with your doctor >>>>> and take on some level of faith, perhaps from user reviews of others that >>>>> have taken the same leap of faith before you. I think >>>>> Bruno has a result that this necessarily requires some act of >>>>> faith, regardless of how far neuroscience advances. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> 2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an >>>>>> appropriately programmed digital computer >>>>> >>>>> To what accuracy over what domain? Does it matter whether the accuracy >>>>> is 99% or 10%? >>>>> >>>>> Let's say functional equivalence at 100%, the indecision is how much of >>>>> the low-level to capture. At the highest level you might have a lookup >>>>> table and nothing below is the same (this was Ned Block's "Blockhead" >>>>> argument against functionalism--he missed the notion of a substitution >>>>> level), at a lower level you might simulate the neurons, again, 100% >>>>> accurately, but you might miss some computational step that is important >>>>> for your consciousness, and so on. For example, the steps your brain >>>>> goes through when I ask you to add 2 and 3 is very different and results >>>>> in very different conscious states than when I ask a pocket calculator to >>>>> do the same. If I substituted the part of your brain that does >>>>> arithmetic with a pocket calculator, this would alter your conscious >>>>> perception, even if it left you outwardly, functionally identical. >>> >>> Exactly. >> >> OK. I agree too, with Jason. (I have not written the text above, but it >> makes sense). >> >> >> >>> So how do you know it wouldn't do it without conscious perception at all, >>> i.e. alter it to nothing? And in fact isn't that what learning the >>> multiplication table does, it eliminates computation for single digit >>> numbers. So that's the point of my question. What do "functional >>> equivalence" really mean. >> >> Good question. I would avoid functional equivalence at this level. The >> “computational equivalence” is conceptually simpler, although provably >> highly not constructive: two computation are equivalent if the first person >> experience is the same. > > But the first person experience is by definition only experienced by one > person, so there can never be a judgement the two different first person > experiences are the same.
That is true for different persons, but anyone can decide he has survived, assuming computationalism. No body can prove that he has survived, and that is why Mechanism is a theology, a belief in a non communicable form of technological reincarnation. The real trouble is that many will say yes to the doctor just because they have a uncle who has a job on Mars, and use classical teleportation everyday, without any problem. But that is not a proof of course, but it is an evidences that some will accept and other not. > >> By definition of the substitution level, all computations “below” that level >> are equivalent, and the consciousness flux will be multiplied by the >> consistent extensions differentiating “continuously”, with the topology >> given by the semantics of the relevant modes of self (in this case []p & <>t >> & p). >> >> >> >> >>> Does it just mean "no noticeable difference in behavior", i.e. third person >>> equivalence? >> >> >> Usually “functional equivalence” is an extensional 3p notion in computer >> science, and then you have a zoo of syntactical weaker equivalence. I said >> two words about this in the combinators thread. Pure functional equivalence >> is equal to having the same input output, > > Input and output depend on some well defined boundary between the parts of > the computation. A condition I think is lacking in this case. ? The input is what is provided by the sense organs, or by some oracle. Yes the delineation is unclear, but completely specified by the digitalise surgeon, and again, we have to trust him or pray. The computationalist practice requires faith. > >> even if one is run by a quantum computer using a quantum algorithm and the >> other is run by a Babbage machine. But with mention to the level of >> substitution, computational equivalence requires not only to compute the >> right local function, but also the way that function is computed (above the >> substitution level). Now, when you have that right loop in place, it will >> not matter if you compute it in this or that way, in a physical reality, or >> in the arithmetical reality, or in the fortranical reality, or in a (rich) >> combinatory algebra, etc. >> >> >> >>> But then it seems the theory talks about "preserving consciousness", a >>> first-person...what? perception that I'm me? What perception could you >>> have that told you your consciousness had changed or been lost? >> >> It is the difference between going out of the hospital, feeling alive and >> well, or dying (whatever that means for the 1p). Of course, in “reality” you >> will have intermediate, like feeling alive, but not so well, …, needing many >> post arraignment, discovering new consciousness state pleasant or >> unpleasant, etc. > > No. That doesn't work because the feeling is the computation. It is a category error to identify a feeling (which is 1p) with a computation (which is arithmetical 3p, or physical 1p plural). > There isn't some separate feeling of the computation. There is a p feeling associate to all computations, and obeying o the logic of some self-modes. > >> >> Accident happens, like the guy who said, when asked if he was happy with his >> artificial brain: “- I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic I am completely happy with my …tclic I am completely >> happy with my …tclic (cf Britannia Hospital). > > All third person, observable behavior. Can you prove he's not completely > happy? Of course, I can’t prove that. Nor can I prove that you would not be completely happy if I replace your brain with grass. But I doubt you would use the cheap teleportation device which transforms you body into grass or spaghetti. > >> >> >> Please note that the provable ethic of mechanism consists in the right to >> say “no” to the doctor, at least for adults. > > An interesting qualification! Do you think children are not conscious? I think that children are conscious, even more so than adult, but in our society, little children are not morally responsible, and that is why some dies because their parents does not trust this or that aspect of medicine. I don’t defend this, but that is the case today, and it is hard to solve that problem. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/64e84a1a-b02c-7e80-5761-ee3e0089809d%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/64e84a1a-b02c-7e80-5761-ee3e0089809d%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/244DF3EF-A096-458D-BFF9-E9D3B7A0932D%40ulb.ac.be.
