On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 8:23 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:54 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> On 5/9/2019 5:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> > >> > That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through >> > that state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify >> > itself with any one particular thread of computation. In this sense >> > that consciousness is not the same as one of the programs passing >> > through that state. But to say the consciousness is not identical >> > with one of the computations is different from saying that computation >> > is not conscious. If none of the threads of computation resulted in >> > consciousness, you wouldn't magically get consciousness once you >> > reached an infinite number of them. The only thing you gain with the >> > infinite number of all the computations going through that state is >> > the correct statistics regarding the future evolution of that conscious. >> >> "The state" seems a problematic concept to me. It tries to roughly >> equate a state of consciousness, a thought, with a state of a Turing >> machine (plus tape). But saying yes to the doctor implies a much lower >> level of substitution than "a thought". Thoughts come from perceptions, >> among other things, which are not complete thoughts or "states of >> consciousness". So it is not at all clear what it means for >> "computations going thru that state" when the state may refer to >> thousands of steps of the Turing machine. Is a computation thread that >> share 999 of the states "going thru the state"? And to further >> complicate this mapping between thoughts and machine states, there >> sequence of machine states is the same at the temporal order of thoughts. >> > > I think the level of confusion is even greater than this. In order to > develop the YD+CT argument, one must assume the existence of a physical > world that is independent of the consciousness one is trying to emulate in > a computer. But if this physical world is just statistics over the > computations through the conscious state, then altering the physical world > (by constructing the computer to replace the brain) must alter the > conscious state, since the physical world is not independent of the > conscious state in that case. If the YD+CT argument based on the assumption > of an independent physical world leads to the conclusion that there is no > independent physical world, then you have a reductio ad absurdum, and the > argument cannot be valid. > > It's not that there are no independent physical worlds, but that the reasoning eventually leads to an altered concept for that the perceived physical world is (it is an ensemble of worlds). The best analogy I can think of is Operating systems and Applications. Consider the operating system as a physical world and applications as the conscious minds in that world. Now there are millions of computers on Earth running all kinds of various operating systems, but on those different operating systems you might find the same programs, Firefox, say. If firefox were conscious, what would it be like to be Firefox? Firefox might make an observation that gives it a hint as to what operating system it is in, such as Windows, Mac, Linux, etc. Let's say it makes a system call and determines itself to be in a Mac (now there are still millions of instances of Firefox running on macs, which it cannot distinguish itself from). From it's point of view, there is not any one operating system it is a part of or belongs to. Now given that, if Firefox crashes on one of those computers, it the other applications on that computer might miss it. It is still of value to relaunch it on the computer where it crashed. This is like the YD. True, we are not creating a new consciousness by relaunching Firefox, for Firefox exists in many other locations, but we can still relaunch it locally, and this allows it to manifest there and continue to live on and interact with other processes in that local operating system. Likewise, if you are given the opportunity to extend your life, via some digital substitution of all or part of your brain in this universe, there may be value in doing so, as you can live on in this universe and continue to interact with other people. Now the definitions of "you" and "universes" only start to become problematic when you consider an infinite reality where the UD exists (e.g. in arithmetical realism), then the notions of "you" must take into account that you exist in innumerable universes, and accordingly the idea of a "universe" as something you observe must take into account your innumerable copies existing as substructures of innumerable larger programs (i.e. like operating systems), such that the observations you make don't really relate to any one of them in particular, and you get an ensemble of measured values for each observation you make (and further localize yourself). Think of it like Firefox reading the root file system directory "C:\", it sees mostly the same files in a lot of Windows operating systems, but some variation, but as it descends into the file system hierarchy, into C:\Documents and Settings\, and C:\Documents and Settings\Users, and C:\Documents and Settings\Users\Bob, it increasingly narrows its existence to ever smaller fractions (from where it started in a more amnesiac state). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhL0JATWMDuN9SdLKfquYh-uDi0BMAmvfkK5sfGL2T1dw%40mail.gmail.com. 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