> On 13 May 2019, at 20:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We must assume the existence of a physical reality, sure, but we don’t need 
>> to assume that the physical reality is fundamental or independent of the 
>> mind of the universal numbers (which requires only arithmetic). 
> 
> If we must assume it then that's what I'd call fundamental.

That depends on what goal “must” refer to.

To understand the thought experiences, we *must* assumed implicitly a physical 
reality, but we don’t need to assume at that stage that the physical reality is 
ontological. Better to be neutral on this.

Then the reasoning eventually has to conclude that this physical reality, 
assumed at the start, has to be recovered by a physics reducible to arithmetic 
of Turing equivalent.

To assume something to understand an argument is not the same as to assume 
something in a theory of everything, especially if the assumption is only used 
to make clear (in everyday terms) what at some point (step 7) becomes a purely 
(meta) arithmetical problem. 

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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