> On 17 May 2019, at 22:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/17/2019 7:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> But then it seems the theory talks about "preserving consciousness", a >>>>> first-person...what? perception that I'm me? What perception could you >>>>> have that told you your consciousness had changed or been lost? >>>> >>>> It is the difference between going out of the hospital, feeling alive and >>>> well, or dying (whatever that means for the 1p). Of course, in “reality” >>>> you will have intermediate, like feeling alive, but not so well, …, >>>> needing many post arraignment, discovering new consciousness state >>>> pleasant or unpleasant, etc. >>> >>> No. That doesn't work because the feeling is the computation. >> >> >> It is a category error to identify a feeling (which is 1p) with a >> computation (which is arithmetical 3p, or physical 1p plural). > > Ok, the feeling supervenes on the computation. But it still doesn't answer > the question, "...the theory talks about "preserving consciousness", a > first-person...what? perception that I'm me? What perception could you have > that told you your consciousness had changed or been lost?”
For the loss of it, I will have to read the 3p report “the guy teleported himself to Mars and die”. For the change of consciousness, well, if you wake up on Mars with a headache, but with a feeling that something is wrong, it is up to you to explain this to your doctor. It is personal. The point is just that IF mechanism is true, then to make a prediction you need to “compute” your first person indeterminacy, or to use physics, but then you need to reduce it the the first person statistics, given by the material modes of self-reference. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/940b4261-e8a9-540e-d657-d9a59b0236db%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E6FF1FE0-5C36-4AFC-A9F8-499FCFFC411A%40ulb.ac.be.
