> On 10 May 2019, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:54 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> 
> wrote:
> On 5/9/2019 5:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through 
> > that state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify 
> > itself with any one particular thread of computation. In this sense 
> > that consciousness is not the same as one of the programs passing 
> > through that state.  But to say the consciousness is not identical 
> > with one of the computations is different from saying that computation 
> > is not conscious.  If none of the threads of computation resulted in 
> > consciousness, you wouldn't magically get consciousness once you 
> > reached an infinite number of them.  The only thing you gain with the 
> > infinite number of all the computations going through that state is 
> > the correct statistics regarding the future evolution of that conscious.
> 
> "The state" seems a problematic concept to me.  It tries to roughly 
> equate a state of consciousness, a thought, with a state of a Turing 
> machine (plus tape).  But saying yes to the doctor implies a much lower 
> level of substitution than "a thought".  Thoughts come from perceptions, 
> among other things, which are not complete thoughts or "states of 
> consciousness".  So it is not at all clear what it means for 
> "computations going thru that state" when the state may refer to 
> thousands of steps of the Turing machine.  Is a computation thread that 
> share 999 of the states "going thru the state"?  And to further 
> complicate this mapping between thoughts and machine states, there 
> sequence of machine states is the same at the temporal order of thoughts.
> 
> I think the level of confusion is even greater than this. In order to develop 
> the YD+CT argument, one must assume the existence of a physical world that is 
> independent of the consciousness one is trying to emulate in a computer.

We must assume the existence of a physical reality, sure, but we don’t need to 
assume that the physical reality is fundamental or independent of the mind of 
the universal numbers (which requires only arithmetic). 



> But if this physical world is just statistics over the computations through 
> the conscious state, then altering the physical world (by constructing the 
> computer to replace the brain) must alter the conscious state, since the 
> physical world is not independent of the conscious state in that case. If the 
> YD+CT argument based on the assumption of an independent physical world leads 
> to the conclusion that there is no independent physical world, then you have 
> a reductio ad absurdum, and the argument cannot be valid.

The assumption of a physical reality +mechanism, just leads to the idea that 
the physical reality is not fundamental, but. Emerges from the inside view in 
arithmetic.

Bruno 



> 
> Bruce
> 
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