On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 12:07 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 5:34 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 6:08 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 11:30 PM Bruce Kellett < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> From: Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:26 AM Bruce Kellett < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> From: Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can >>>>>> be clear which one we are speaking of: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical >>>>>> component which implements its functions digitally (here we change >>>>>> nothing >>>>>> about our assumption of what the physical universe is) >>>>>> 2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an >>>>>> appropriately programmed digital computer >>>>>> >>>>>> That implies that my consciousness is just a single computation, >>>>>> potentially implemented on a linear Turing machine. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That I said supervene implies that a many-to-one relationship between >>>>> computations and mental states. >>>>> This is no different from any other functionalist or even physicalist >>>>> theories of mind. That there are neutrinos going through your brain means >>>>> there are different physical states, but these neutrinos (supposedly) >>>>> don't >>>>> alter your conscious state. Therefore, that many different different >>>>> patterns of neutrinos in your brain result in the same mental/conscious >>>>> state suggests a many-to-one relationship between physical states and >>>>> mental states. >>>>> >>>>> The important point here is that only one pattern of neutrinos exists >>>>> in my brain at any one time. It is not the case that I am a superposition >>>>> of several different patterns. Think of it this way: You can describe the >>>>> action of the brain in consciousness at several different levels: The >>>>> functional level (this brain is conscious); the neuronal level (these >>>>> particular neurons are firing); the chemical level (these particular >>>>> neurotransmitters are flowing here and there); the molecular level (these >>>>> neurons and neurotransmitters are made up of such and such molecules >>>>> interacting in these ways); or the level of atoms, quarks, electromagnetic >>>>> fields, etc, which make up the molecules. All of these levels of >>>>> description are possible, but the all describe the same single brain in >>>>> action. There are not separate simultaneous consciousnesses according to >>>>> each level of description - each underlying program if you like. >>>>> Consciousness is a unitary thing, it is not made up of the sum over, or >>>>> statistics of, many different computational streams. There may be >>>>> different >>>>> level of description, but there is only one consciousness for each >>>>> physical >>>>> brain. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Bruce, >>>> >>>> I did not mean to suggest that there were multiple consciousnesses >>>> manifested by one brain, but rather my point is that many different >>>> physical states can correspond to the same conscious state. I.e., if the >>>> neutrinos in your brain were in a different pattern right now, I would >>>> wager that your consciousness would not be any different. >>>> >>> >>> That may well be the case, but I fail to see the relevance of such an >>> observation. My consciousness supervenes on my brain as it is now -- it >>> does not supervene on other possibilities. If you think it does, then prove >>> it! >>> >> >> Do you not think counterfactuals are useful in evaluating theories? >> > > Not particularly. What use is it to speculate about what happens in > unrealised scenarios? We want to know what happens in real life....... > > Because life isn't a single event. Future events happen too. The purpose of the brain is to plan for those future events and respond in a manner consistent with our best understanding of the world. If a theory can't handle couterfactuals, it can't even make predictions. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjYP5F2ng7gRPHD9ubhZRUrm1XvCtQo9%3D5wf%3DG1%2BZ2enQ%40mail.gmail.com.
