This is what I call one form of *consciousness denial*
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
in that information processing absent actual *first-class* entities of
qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information
processing operating in a *material substrate* where those entities are
available to be combined and manipulated.
@philipthrift
On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 7:05:53 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> The question is why does it supervene on the brain and not on the elbow.
> What about the brain causes it to "make experiences"? Most scientists
> think it is because the brain does computations, i.e. information
> processing, which is more extensive and complex that the elbow does. Which
> leads to Bruno's argument that if it is the information processing that
> produces mind, then mind can be instantiated by any sufficiently complex
> computer+program. Since he believes in arithmetical realism, and since all
> possible computations exist implicitly in arithmetic, it follows that all
> possible thoughts already exist in arithmetic and we can explain reality as
> some particular subset of those thoughts.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 6:55:08 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> mind supervenes on the brain
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
> The heart* pumps blood.
> The brain pumps experiences.
>
> The brain is an experience pump!
>
> * Actually it's more complex: blood cells are made in bone marrow signaled
> by the kidneys and recycled by the spleen. Do it's
> kidneys+marrow+spleen+heart that make and pump blood. The brain makes and
> pumps experiences.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
>
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