On Saturday, June 1, 2019 at 3:11:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 31 May 2019, at 14:13, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > But you just said in another post that you are familiar with Roger Penrose > writing about non-computational phenomena. How do you reconcile > non-computational phenomena with computationalism ? > > > Despite his non valid use of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Penrose is > coherent with my reasoning. He believes in primitive matter and reject > mechanism. I keep mechanism and reject materialism. My simpler result > staring the whole thing is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible. > > We have NOT MAT v NOT MEC, > > Equivalently, we have > > MEC -> NOT MAT, > > and > > MAT -> NOT MEC > > Bruno > >
Materialism = (Quantum)Mechanism+Experientialism (or just *Experiential Mechanism*) *Husserl Revisited: The Forgotten Distinction Between Psychology and Phenomenology * Jerry L. Jennings https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jerry_Jennings/publication/232418268_Husserl_Revisited_The_Forgotten_Distinction_Between_Psychology_and_Phenomenology/links/568d706408aeaa1481ae545d/Husserl-Revisited-The-Forgotten-Distinction-Between-Psychology-and-Phenomenology.pdf?origin=publication_detail Husserl condemned the philosophy which equates experience with physical events. Basically, the forgotten distinction between phenomenology and psychology is that the former analyzes the essential character of various types of conscious acts, whereas the latter studies the empirical contents of actual subjective experiences corresponding to actual existent environmental events. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6aafab6d-cacc-44cb-8009-7da0d324d95d%40googlegroups.com.
