On Sunday, June 2, 2019 at 3:43:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 1 Jun 2019, at 11:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, June 1, 2019 at 3:11:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 31 May 2019, at 14:13, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> But you just said in another post that you are familiar with Roger >> Penrose writing about non-computational phenomena. How do you reconcile >> non-computational phenomena with computationalism ? >> >> >> Despite his non valid use of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Penrose is >> coherent with my reasoning. He believes in primitive matter and reject >> mechanism. I keep mechanism and reject materialism. My simpler result >> staring the whole thing is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible. >> >> We have NOT MAT v NOT MEC, >> >> Equivalently, we have >> >> MEC -> NOT MAT, >> >> and >> >> MAT -> NOT MEC >> >> Bruno >> >> > > Materialism = (Quantum)Mechanism+Experientialism > > (or just *Experiential Mechanism*) > > > > Gödel’s theorem imposes the nuances between all neoplatonist modes of the > self: > > p (truth, “god") > []p (proof, the world of ideas, the Noùs) > []p & p (first person experience, the soul) > > []p & <>t (material sharable experiment, first person plural realities) > []p & <>t & p (material sensible first person experience) > > So you don’t need to add experimentalism, nor materialism, as they are > explained from the modes of the digital machine self. > > Bruno >
All logical languages need a substrate (just as all programs need a computer) to be real. *Husserl Revisited: The Forgotten Distinction Between Psychology and > Phenomenology * > Jerry L. Jennings > > https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jerry_Jennings/publication/232418268_Husserl_Revisited_The_Forgotten_Distinction_Between_Psychology_and_Phenomenology/links/568d706408aeaa1481ae545d/Husserl-Revisited-The-Forgotten-Distinction-Between-Psychology-and-Phenomenology.pdf?origin=publication_detail > > @philipthrift > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/980da58f-fcf5-4fe9-998b-283192df7af2%40googlegroups.com.
