> On 2 Jun 2019, at 15:05, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, June 2, 2019 at 3:43:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 1 Jun 2019, at 11:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, June 1, 2019 at 3:11:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 31 May 2019, at 14:13, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> But you just said in another post that you are familiar with Roger Penrose >>> writing about non-computational phenomena. How do you reconcile >>> non-computational phenomena with computationalism ? >> >> Despite his non valid use of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Penrose is >> coherent with my reasoning. He believes in primitive matter and reject >> mechanism. I keep mechanism and reject materialism. My simpler result >> staring the whole thing is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible. >> >> We have NOT MAT v NOT MEC, >> >> Equivalently, we have >> >> MEC -> NOT MAT, >> >> and >> >> MAT -> NOT MEC >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Materialism = (Quantum)Mechanism+Experientialism >> >> (or just Experiential Mechanism) > > > Gödel’s theorem imposes the nuances between all neoplatonist modes of the > self: > > p (truth, “god") > []p (proof, the world of ideas, the Noùs) > []p & p (first person experience, the soul) > > []p & <>t (material sharable experiment, first person plural realities) > []p & <>t & p (material sensible first person experience) > > So you don’t need to add experimentalism, nor materialism, as they are > explained from the modes of the digital machine self. > > Bruno > > > All logical languages need a substrate (just as all programs need a computer) > to be real.
You assume a primitive physical reality. The test does not confirms this up to now. If the theory of matter that is in the mind of all universal numbers in arithmetic (something that anyone can verify) appears different from the physics that we infer from observation, then we could say that there is some physical evidence for a primary physical reality, but that has not yet been shown. Bruno > >> Husserl Revisited: The Forgotten Distinction Between Psychology and >> Phenomenology >> Jerry L. Jennings >> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jerry_Jennings/publication/232418268_Husserl_Revisited_The_Forgotten_Distinction_Between_Psychology_and_Phenomenology/links/568d706408aeaa1481ae545d/Husserl-Revisited-The-Forgotten-Distinction-Between-Psychology-and-Phenomenology.pdf?origin=publication_detail >> >> <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jerry_Jennings/publication/232418268_Husserl_Revisited_The_Forgotten_Distinction_Between_Psychology_and_Phenomenology/links/568d706408aeaa1481ae545d/Husserl-Revisited-The-Forgotten-Distinction-Between-Psychology-and-Phenomenology.pdf?origin=publication_detail>@philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/980da58f-fcf5-4fe9-998b-283192df7af2%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/980da58f-fcf5-4fe9-998b-283192df7af2%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39B90D68-1AED-4341-B20D-9802EDA31E95%40ulb.ac.be.
