> On 2 Jun 2019, at 17:52, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > How is he coherent with you if he is aware of non-computable phenomenon, > while you are oblivious ?
Pensose is coherent because Mechanism and Materialism are inconsistent when taken together. So a Mechanist must abandon Materialism, which is what I do, methodologically, as Mechanism is my working hypothesis. And a materialist like Penrose has to abandon Mechanism, which he did. I am not sure why you say that I am oblivious of non computable phenomena. If we assume mechanism, we assume to be at least Turing Universal, and the Turing universal being are only *partially computable”. All semantic attribute of digital machine are provably highly not computable. The simplest of them: the halting of the program/digital-machine is not computable in advance, and the universal Löbian machine are aware of their own non computability, and can refute all complete effective theories about them. There know that they have a Soul (accepting the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus) and that their soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in any third person terms. Computer science is concerned a lot with non computable notions. 99,9999999 % of the arithmetical is highly not computable, but plays a key role in the machine’s self”s phenomenology. Löbian machine (i.e. universal machine aware of their universality, like PA) cannot predict their own behaviour, and they know that, giving them a base for a (compatibilist) notion of free-will. Recursion theory is often named “computability theory”, but it is mainly a theory of degrees of non computability. All this was (is) well known in mathematical logic and theoretical computer science. I can explain more on this if people asks me. To be sure, this week I have many oral exams (June period), so apology for possible delays in comment. Bruno > > On Saturday, 1 June 2019 11:11:50 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 31 May 2019, at 14:13, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> But you just said in another post that you are familiar with Roger Penrose >> writing about non-computational phenomena. How do you reconcile >> non-computational phenomena with computationalism ? > > Despite his non valid use of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Penrose is > coherent with my reasoning. He believes in primitive matter and reject > mechanism. I keep mechanism and reject materialism. My simpler result staring > the whole thing is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/23d9580f-d5e4-482b-9460-91edc7fbb5b9%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/23d9580f-d5e4-482b-9460-91edc7fbb5b9%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1EDD716C-FD5F-445D-8F53-0D20AF9A5823%40ulb.ac.be.
