> On 17 Jun 2019, at 11:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 17, 2019 at 2:54:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Jun 2019, at 13:46, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, June 16, 2019 at 6:25:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 15 Jun 2019, at 20:57, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave >>> materialism behind and go to idealism. >> >> I agree. And it eliminates or trivialises the psychism by identifying it >> with everything. It is materialism, structured in a way to prevent *any* >> theory of mind. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> But I adhere to panpsychic materialism. >> >> So there. :) > > If you assume a material reality at the start, you need to abandon the > mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science. Your brain and body need a non > computational solution of some differential equation, so that your > “substitution level” is made infinitely low. But then, you need to abandon > the theory of evolution by Darwin, molecular genetics, and this leads to a > form of super determinism, where you and your brain exists only due to > infinitely precise initial conditions. This eliminates the possibility of > using the Mechanist theory of consciousness, to allow a necessity of some > ontological commitment. That looks like making things more complicated, > without evidence, just to cherish a conception of reality that you like, and > which speculates on evidences not yet obtained. It is logically coherent > (unlike those who want both primary matter and Mechanism), but seems *very* > speculative to me. > > Bruno > > > > As I wrote elsewhere: > > The problem with "all is arithmetic/numbers" and "all is > consciousness/qualia”
Of course, that is already a contradiction. > is that while we know we have a "self" (our self-experience of consciousness) > and may even believe in (the fiction of) mathematics, we are in a world We certainly “are in a world”. The question is what is the nature of the world. A dream? A computation? Infinitely many computations? Or an irreducibly material world. My point is that IF Mechanism is true in cognitive science, then the physical reality is explainable without an ontological commitment in an irreducible physical reality. There is nothing from with physics, but physicalism is incoherent, in that mechanist setting. > where we see the science news* of materials science -- where some > scientists/technologists find some really frickingly weird property of some > exotic material. So there is all this weird stuff we find out about new > materials, to say nothing of stuff we don't know about, like dark matter. (As > Auden said, "Matter is much / Odder than we thought.”) That is a prediction of mechanism: the phenomenology is unbounded in the number of surprises, even just ion numbers. Yes, matter is much odder than we can think, and the mind too. But with mechanism, the first is reducible to the second. > > If there isn't some sort of "independent" material world (which we are > embedded in though), But there is an independent of “us” (us the humans) physical reality. There is no independent of “us” (us the universal numbers) physical reality. > then where does these surprising material properties discovered by materials > scientists come from? It comes from the more sophisticated consequences of 2+2=4. That is the amazing consequence of incompleteness. Even limited to third person arithmetical facts, there is an infinity of surprises. > Do we just dream them up as we dream up matter itself, or they come out of > Peano arithmetic? They comes from Robinson Arithmetic (a quite tiny subset of Peano Arithmetic). Peano arithmetic is the dreamer, whose existence is provided by Robinson arithmetic. > > * https://news.google.com/search?q=materials%20science > > Since we don't know all the properties of matter (it could have both > extrinsic arithmetical and intrinsic qualial properties), one can't conclude > anything about what follows from assuming its "primary" existence. If we assume that matter has a primary existence, and that there is a relation between matter and consciousness (that matter is related to what we observe), we have to bring a non computational theory of mind. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8c868209-860c-41b5-8a2f-8d2fb54aea5d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8c868209-860c-41b5-8a2f-8d2fb54aea5d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E5A7F76F-891C-4BF9-97FE-0939E2084EEA%40ulb.ac.be.
