On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> The universal machine provides an account of its >>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to >>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). >>> >>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very >>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even >>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. >>> >>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, >>> as long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. >>> >>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in >>> the universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. >>> >>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively >>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they >>> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that >>> they aren’t. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >> >> >> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just >> as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) >> we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties >> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, >> selfness, …). >> >> >> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not >> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge >> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it). >> >> >> >> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* >> - as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint. >> >> >> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to >> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the >> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further >> assumption). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > In the end I can see *number crunching* - of numbers of whatever level or > "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) *at best* of > what there is in reality - which is called* matter*. > > > I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the > digitalist doctor. > > I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by > “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying > yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it > is argued, less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, > making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable. > > Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist > hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my > work, of course). > > Bruno > > > >
matter = material substratum The existence of a *material substratum* was posited by John Locke <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke>, with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza>'s *substance* and Immanuel Kant <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant>'s concept of the *noumenon <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon>* (in *The Critique of Pure Reason <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Critique_of_Pure_Reason>*). - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/95109754-df4c-4758-a412-087ab0284314%40googlegroups.com.
