On Friday, June 28, 2019 at 4:58:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 Jun 2019, at 16:23, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> The universal machine provides an account of its >>>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to >>>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). >>>> >>>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very >>>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even >>>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. >>>> >>>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, >>>> as long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. >>>> >>>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in >>>> the universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. >>>> >>>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively >>>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that >>>> they >>>> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that >>>> they aren’t. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just >>> as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) >>> we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties >>> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, >>> selfness, …). >>> >>> >>> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not >>> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge >>> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it). >>> >>> >>> >>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* >>> - as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint. >>> >>> >>> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to >>> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the >>> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further >>> assumption). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> In the end I can see *number crunching* - of numbers of whatever level >> or "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) *at best* of >> what there is in reality - which is called* matter*. >> >> >> I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the >> digitalist doctor. >> >> I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean >> by “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by >> saying yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, >> and it is argued, less trivially that it should be the same observable as >> ours, making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable. >> >> Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist >> hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my >> work, of course). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > matter = material substratum > > The existence of a *material substratum* was posited by John Locke > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke>, > > > I would have said that Aristotle, and perhaps the ancient atomist did come > up with this before. > > > > with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza>'s *substance* > > > > I tend to agree with you, but among my students this year I have a > philosopher who like very much Spinoza, and he criticises a lot that > interpretation of Spinoza. Now, he considers only Spinoza treatise “the > Ethic”, and dismiss most of his other writing. I find Spinoza not enough > clear on this. > > > > > and Immanuel Kant <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant>'s concept > of the *noumenon <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon>* (in *The > Critique of Pure Reason > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Critique_of_Pure_Reason>*). > > > Again, I agree with you, but hereto Kant is unclear, and different readers > have different opinion on this. > > > > > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon > > > > Substance is the latine for the greek Hypostasis. The word “substance" in > philosophy is sometimes used for Aristotle’s primary matter, which is at > the antipode of the use of “hypostasis” by the neoplatonist, where the > hypostases are more like fundamental modes of view. > > The "material hypostases” (sensible and intelligible matter) are more > close to the modern idea of “invariant” in physics than of a material > substance that things should be made-of. > I don’t assume that type of thing. Like God, it is too much unclear to be > assumed in a fundamental theory, I think. > > With the computationalist theory of mind, it does not make sense at all. > Now, a departure between G* “theory of matter” and observation would be an > evidence against computationalism, and so, indirectly, perhaps, an evidence > for some substance, but even this is not so obvious. If Mechanism is false, > we might need some infinities having a rôle in consciousness, but the > notion of ontological substance remains unclear. > > Bruno > > >
If an ARM processor running any ARM code [ http://www.toves.org/books/arm/ ] program is ever conscious, or a computer consisting of 10^10 ARM processors running multiprocessor ARM code is ever conscious them the "computationalist theory of mind" holds. If not, it doesn't. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/645485fa-7161-4961-86f6-b82cca4a08da%40googlegroups.com.
