> On 25 Jul 2019, at 23:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/25/2019 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Jul 2019, at 07:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/24/2019 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> Note that the personal identity is not a transitive notion. Step 3 >>>>> actually illustrates well this. I recall he cut and copy itself from >>>>> Helsinki (H) in both Washington (W) and Moscow (M). With the definition >>>>> of the personal identity above, both the HW and the HM guy are, from that >>>>> personal identity view, the same person as the H person. >>>>> >>>>> With a more sensible notion of personal identity, the copies are >>>>> different persons, and different persons from the original. >>>> >>>> >>>> But that would entail that you die in step 1, which would again just be >>>> your opinion that mechanism is false. >>> >>> Why do you assume this is all-or-nothing, live-or-die? >> >> Because digitalness makes it so. The copies are numerically identical at or >> below the substitution level. > > What does "numerically identical" mean?
It means encode by the same natural number, or binary digits. Compare a digital clock and an analog clock. > And what if they aren't? By definition of the step 3, and digital mechanism, it is the same code which is sent to Washington and Moscow. It is the same binary digits, if binary digits are used. > You're shifting the argument. One may very well say "yes" to the doctor > believing that one's essential character and memories will be preserved, > while also believing that many details will be different. If some details are different (others than seeing different cities after opening the reconstitution box, of course), it means that the functional digital substitution has not been made at the right level. > So which is it? Is it essential to your argument that the duplication be > exact?...exact at what level? At the substitution level, or below. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> >> >> >>> What seems likely to me is that the copy will be necessarily different due >>> to information limitations of quantum mechanics… >> >> Quantum mechanics, nor any physics, is part of the assumption, except for >> the existence of a physical reality (but not necessarily an ontological >> existence). >> >> >> >>> but maybe not so different that one would still say yes to the doctor, >>> depending on the alternatives. >> >> Yes. There are the usual difference between our mental state, but the >> personal identity is defined by the ability to have our past experience >> memories, which by definition are conserved in the process. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c95deaa2-d03e-0e65-472d-ad0154bef80e%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c95deaa2-d03e-0e65-472d-ad0154bef80e%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/896441C8-1303-4EBD-8C1F-B140D540F4A9%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/896441C8-1303-4EBD-8C1F-B140D540F4A9%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11528ea0-93cc-1a2c-75cf-e3fd08c997d8%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11528ea0-93cc-1a2c-75cf-e3fd08c997d8%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/14C8214F-E61E-4450-AD1C-37AD1B2B143B%40ulb.ac.be.
