On 7/27/2019 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jul 2019, at 19:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 7/26/2019 12:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You're shifting the argument. One may very well say "yes" to the doctor
believing that one's essential character and memories will be preserved, while also
believing that many details will be different.
If some details are different (others than seeing different cities after
opening the reconstitution box, of course), it means that the functional
digital substitution has not been made at the right level.
So the thought experiment relies on the reconstitution being exact in every
detail?
At the right substitution level.
Iff it is incorrect below that level, that would not influence the first person
experience, by the very definition of the substitution level.
But as everyone who is not a logician knows you cannot define something
into existence. The problem is that you rely on the intuition of
materialism that functional substitutions will leave consciousness
sufficiently similar that one might say yes to the doctor. But then you
seem to rely on it not simply being adequate, but being exact so that
the subject could not notice.
Brent
So which is it? Is it essential to your argument that the duplication be
exact?...exact at what level?
At the substitution level, or below.
But the question is whether such a "substitution level" exists,
I am not really interested in that question. The existence of such a level is
my working hypothesis. Then we extracts physics and can see if it is plausible
with the observation. To discuss at the start of the level exists can only lead
to infinite vague sharing of personal opinions. Better to study the observable
consequence, and judge from facts.
But it is a fact that there is a well proven empirical bound to
duplication. So your working hypothesis might be wrong even though
saying "yes" to the doctor would be a good idea.
and whether it exists depends on how exact the substitute must be. Quantum
mechanics
But it is better to not use any hypothesis in physics, when doing metaphysics.
I do not assume quantum mechanics.
You don't assume it until you make some inference that agrees with it,
and then you claim it supports your theory. By the same token it can
undermine your theory.
places a limit on this and does not permit an exact substitute. So it comes
down to a question of how much difference is tolerable. That will depend on
other external factors.
No difference in the subjective experience is tolerated.
Yet no one asked to say "yes" to the doctor is likely to demand that
level of accuracy. So the fact that materialist would say "yes" to the
doctor does not mean they are guilty of contradiction when they point
out that your duplication experiment is nomologically impossible.
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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