> On 27 Jul 2019, at 21:39, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/27/2019 4:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 26 Jul 2019, at 19:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/26/2019 12:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> But it seems like an ad hoc assumption to save your theory. >>>> On the contrary, it becomes a theorem. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>> OK, what's the proof that humans need a brain, given nothing but >>> computationalism as an axiom. >> Computationalism requires a universal machine A implemented in another >> universal machine or universal machinery B. > > Are you claiming that follows deductively from YD+CT? Or that its "required" > in order that your theory hold?
It follows from CT. It should be obvious, so I am not sure why you ask. > >> >> B can be arithmetic or any universal machinery or universal number. >> >> The universal machine A is the one that the machine will call brain, if it >> persists in the majority of the computational extensions, and it will seems >> like a physical gift. > > The brain is a physical thing. All your other "machines" are platonic > objects. They are number relations. The physical things are possibly (and plausibly) analytical (real number relations) emerging from the first person indeterminacy. > So it makes no sense to say that brains, or which there are many, is "the > universal machine", which is a platonic concept. Brains are material implementation of universal machines, and matter are appearance emerging from infinitely many computations in arithmetic, due to the many invariance of the first person experience of the person supported by computations (in arithmetic or Turing equivalent). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d28e4f3c-1306-0181-0e2f-4cbe27d7fc73%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A097521B-30CB-4E9C-AA71-A8AAF335A3CB%40ulb.ac.be.
